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To Elizabeth 
and our daughters, Bailey and Rachel, 
living examples of steadfast love. 
IV 
In that day, declares the Lord, you will call me "my husband"; 
you will no longer call me "my master." 
Hosea 
My song is love. 
Chris Martin 
v 
My project will provide a survey of traditional atonement metaphors, with a par-
ticular emphasis upon contrasting penal substitution with a covenantal relational under-
standing of the atonement, and will then posit that a covenantal relational approach is 
ideal for resonance with a postmodern audience. 
I will seek to determine whether any single biblical metaphor or cluster of meta-
phors provides an interpretive matrix for all discussion of the atonement in a way that is 
both biblically faithful and conceptually accessible to a postmodern world. I contend that 
atonement discussions in typical evangelical contexts may be both biblically insufficient 
and culturally inadequate and that alternatives exist which address both issues. I believe it 
possible to engage with atonement theology in a metaphoric landscape that resonates with 
the postmodern experience of life and scripture as the reader encounters it. This engage-
ment will enable the reader to be better able to access the transformative power of the 
atonement in his or her life. 
In beginning to unpack the problem, one begins by asking whether or not the Bi-
ble presents a unified metaphoric or thematic front in tern1s of making sense of the 
atonement. Is it appropriate to ask for one unifying metaphor? Or, as Scot McKnight, 
along with others, suggests, are we better off comparing the Bible to a bag of golf clubs 
with various metaphors constituting different clubs to be used as the ministry situation 
demands? 1 Some would suggest that their metaphor is the only way to discuss the atone-
1 Scot McKnight, A Community of Atonement (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 
2007) xiii. 
ment and that any discussion that fails to center itself on their framework is no discussion 
of the atonement at all? Is this so? Why do some believe it to be the case? 
Some, like Stephan Finlan, have come to see the atonement as an outdated con-
cept altogether, an archaic relic of Christianity's violent, superstitious past that we can 
now evolve beyond. 3 To them, language and imagery of blood, sacrifice, wrath, propitia-
tion/expiation, or substitution are anathema to postmodern views of the world and God 
and must be jettisoned. 
My interest in this problem has a pragmatic grounding as well as a theological 
one. Having spent over 20 years on the staff of Young Life, an evangelical outreach min-
istry to adolescents that has grounded itself primarily in propositional presentations of 
penal substitutionary atonement, I have developed concerns about the efficacy of this ap-
proach._While we have demonstrated an ability to communicate this approach winsomely 
and have brought literally thousands of adolescents to response, I have seen two disturb-
ing trends developing with young people. 
The first is that, whereas in past years it was mostly a matter of getting kids to 
recognize their need for Jesus within the framework of penal substitution, increasingly 
the fundamental logic of penal substitution seems not only no longer self evident to 
young people but often offensive. Second, I have also seen an increasing tendency for 
this method to "wear off." While initial responses might suggest the value of this ap-
2 Christianity Today's May 2006 issue dedicated to the atonement had "Nothing 
but the Blood" as it's cover byline and the articles and editorials throughout serve as an 
example of the widespread move within some circles of evangelicalism to view Penal 
Substitution as the only appropriate and biblically faithful way to speak of the atonement. 
3 Stephen Finlan, Problems with Atonement (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 
2005) 
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proach, a significant tendency for young people to later walk away from Christian faith 
all together raises questions. 
My anecdotal conversations with young people I have worked with suggests that 
they often come to see the God of penal substitution as cold and capricious (choosing to 
love a few but damning most and being willing to save the guilty at the expense of the 
life of the innocent) and strangely irrelevant to their actual lives (salvation as so config-
ured seems like a fictional or abstract construct that doesn't really change much of how 
they experience their lives in the world). This is not a new sentiment, however. In 1949, 
Dorothy Sayers put it pithily in a sardonic theology quiz: 
Q: What is meant by the atonement? 
A: God wanted to damn everybody, but his vindictive sadism was sated 
by the crucifixion of His own Son, who was quite innocent, and, therefore, 
a particularly attractive victim. He now only damns people who don't fol-
low Christ or who never heard ofHim.4 
I am sure that no proponents of penal substitution would welcome this characteri-
zation as accurate. At the same time, this does seem to be how the penal orientation is 
often perceived. My project, therefore, seeks to determine why this is so. Is the problem 
with this generation of young people or that they have "closed their hearts" to the Gos-
pel? Does it arise from a failure of evangelical evangelists to adequately understand they 
way postmoderns experience the world and to adjust their presentations of the Gospel 
accordingly? To borrow from Leonard Sweet's imagery, are we failing to present an old 
message in a new medium or with a new method?5 Perhaps the problem lies in our pres-
4 Dorothy Sayers, Creed or Chaos? (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, 1949), 33. 
5 Leonard Sweet, ed. The Church in the Emerging Culture. (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 2003). I have encountered this idea ofDr. Sweet's from Sweet himself and 
3 
entations. Could it be that penal substitution is not the most accurate or helpful way to 
describe the work of the cross after all? Perhaps various factors are at play. That is what 
this project will seek to explore. 
This exploration will go in three directions. I will look at the biblical texts with an 
eye toward determining how the Bible actually describes the work and ministry of Jesus. 
How does Jesus save? I will also consider the postmodem landscape on two fronts. The 
first involves modem and postmodem understandings of the self. Who does Jesus save 
and from what? Finally, I will explore how to communicate effectively to a world that 
increasingly distmsts or is disinterested in linear propositional presentations. How do we 
talk in a way that can be understood and received? Is it valid to speak of tmth in non-
propositional ways? 
numerous others. I cannot recall, however, where I first interacted with the idea. This is 
where he first published it. 
4 
Section Two: Other Proposed Solutions 
There is no want for suggestions as to how to engage 21st century culture in the 
West with the atonement. What is more difficult is finding any sort of agreement amongst 
the proliferation of options. The range extends from those who essentially seem to pro-
pose that we just need to say what we've been saying for several hundred years, only 
more loudly,6 to those like Stephen Finlan, for whom the atonement has become an out-
dated relic of an earlier, less ethically and theologically evolved time. In between are 
those who suggest that the atonement remains crucial but should be understood in terms 
other than those of penal substitution, from Aulen's Christus Victor, Abelard's theory of 
Christ as Moral Exemplar, or Girard's theory of Mimetic Violence, to name a few. 7 This 
section will explore some of those options and probe their adequacy for the dual tasks of 
remaining faithful to scripture's understanding of the cross while engaging meaningfully 
with postmodem culture and providing adequate foundation for spiritual formation. 
Penal Substitution 
In beginning with penal substitution, and spending substantially more time cri-
tiquing it than critiquing other models, I do not intend to set it up as the great bane of 
atonement theology. It is but one approach among many and has had significant positive 
6 For a growing number of Evangelicals in the West, penal substitutionary atone-
ment has become a position to be defended with crusade-like fervor. The speaking minis-
try of Seattle based Pastor Mark Driscoll and the writing of theologians like John Piper, 
Pierced for our Transgressions: Rediscovering the Glory of Penal Substitution (Wheaton, 
IL: Crossway Books, 2007) or the controversy in England surrounding Steve Chalke and 
his book written along with Alan Mann, The Lost Message of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 2004), serve as examples. 
7 Peter Schmiechen, in his book, Saving Power (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2005) identifies ten distinct atonement theories. While there is some overlap between 
them, this speaks to the multi-faceted nature of atonement theology. 
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effect in some ways over the last few centuries. I do so because, for many, particularly in 
the evangelical West, penal substitution has virtually become synonymous with the 
atonement itself. This can be seen in the vehemence of its defense by theologians and 
preachers, but also in its prevalence in street-level ministry. If one were to ask the vast 
majority of evangelicals, "What is the heart of the Gospel?" I suspect that most would 
posit some form of penal substitution. For many, it seems there is never a thought that the 
meaning of the cross could be found in any other construct, so closely has penal substitu-
tion become synonymous with Gospel for many evangelicals. 
Others, like John Stott, for example, who do grant that varied metaphors round 
out our understanding of the atonement, still insist that penal substitution be the anchor or 
chief metaphor.8 In this case, penal substitution is not one metaphor among many or one 
metaphor that helps inform some other, larger metaphoric construct. Rather, it is the lens 
through which all other biblical metaphors are seen. This makes substitution a transac-
tiona! issue rather than seeing it within the covenantal framework found in scripture. A 
relationship is what was lost in the Fall, not, primarily, right standing in a legal sense. 
way: 
Penal substitution is defined by one of its champions, Thomas Schreiner, in this 
The Father, because of his love for human beings, sent his Son (who offered him-
self willingly and gladly) to satisfy God's justice, so that Christ took the place of 
8 I. Howard Marshall's, Aspects of the Atonement (Tyrone, GA: Paternoster, 
2007), John Stott's classic, The Cross of Christ (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 
1986), and Leon Morris', The Atonement (Downers Grove, IL: lntervarsity Press, 1983) 
would serve as examples. All three insist that while other metaphors have biblical merit, 
they all seek to inform penal substitution and penal substitution is the lens through which 
all other metaphors draw their meaning. 
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sinners. The punishment and penalty we deserved was laid on Jesus Christ instead 
of us, so that in the cross both God's holiness and love are manifested.9 
Recognizing strengths. While this point can be overplayed by its adherents, it 
must be recognized that penal substitution faces headlong the scandalous elements of the 
atonement. It does not make light of sin; it powerfully argues against any sense that hu-
manity is adequate to deal with sin on its own. There is no Pelagianism to be found here. 
This is highly admirable. 
It also does not shy away from biblical passages and ideas that modem sensibili-
ties might find offensive-passages with ideas like wrath, sacrifice, substitution or judg-
ment. Where some Christian theology seeks to explain these ideas away or eviscerate 
them of any real meaning and, therefore, any real offense, penal substitution makes them 
the centerpieces of the doctrine that encapsulates the saving work of God through Christ 
and for humanity. Whether it does so in an accurate way will be discussed later, but its 
insistence in fidelity to scripture and to the God of scripture is a sure strength. 
In now turning to what I see as weaknesses in penal substitution, I want to empha-
size I am not trying to dismiss either the sincerity of its proponents or the multitudes of 
Christians who have come to faith through presentations of the Gospel centered on penal 
substitution. Penal substitution is vivid, has proven to illicit significant response, takes 
issues of God's righteousness and humanity's sin seriously and certainly, on the face, has 
roots in biblical language, particularly Paul's. 
Mistaking the word for the thing. Much of our current view of penal substitution 
arose in an age dominated by the logical empiricism of Immanuel Kant and others: that 
9Thomas R. Schreiner, "Penal Substitution" in The Nature of the Atonement: Four 
Views, James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic: 2006) 67. 
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which "cannot be translated from metaphorical into 'literal' language cannot be held to 
be true."1° Colin Gunton helpfully illustrates this when he points out that whereas Des-
cartes stated "I have described the Earth and the whole visible universe as if it were a 
machine,'' 11 it is but a short step to then believe that "the world is a machine." Basically, 
we take the metaphor meant to describe the thing and it becomes the thing itself in our 
minds. When we do this in theology, Peter Rollins argues that we are taking what was 
intended to be an icon, using "words, images or experiences as aids [emphasis mine] in 
contemplation of that which cannot be reduced to words, images or experiences,"12 and 
turned it into an idol, an exact representation of the thing itself. A semiotician would say 
that we are confusing the signifier (the metaphor) for the signified (atonement). 13 It is dif-
ficult to determine whether this results from epistemological confusion or arrogance, but 
the result is the same. 
While the danger of doing this lurks constantly at the door of all of our theologi-
cal and ideological pronouncements and is by no means unique to proponents of penal 
substitution, I would argue that they often fall prey to it. They too often succumb to the 
danger of taking language and metaphors that are intended to point toward, point beyond, 
or partially illumine and take them to be the thing itself, to be what literally happens or 
transpires on the cross. For example, Joel Green, who writes strongly in support of the 
1
° Colin Gun ton, The Actuality of the Atonement (London, UK: T &T Clark, 1988), 
30. 
II Ibid. 30. 
12 Peter Rollins, How (Not) to Speak of God (London, UK: Paraclete Press, 2006), 
38. 
13 Arthur Asa Berger, Signs in Contempora1y Culture (Salem, WI: Sheffield Pub-
lishing, 1999), 11. 
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atonement, but in opposition to penal substitution as it is generally presented, relates, 
"My own experience is that, without exception, questions raised against the theory of pe-
nal substitution invite the response, 'So, you don't believe in the atonement?"'14 
Less universal than often presumed. It is often posited by its proponents and per-
ceived by lay Christians that penal substitution's roots lie in Paul and that it has grown 
unquestioned through the history of the church. In reality, penal substitution has not, until 
recently, held such a hegemonic sway over Christian theology. As Colin Gunton (among 
others) helpfully points out, while elements of penal categories are clearly present in 
Paul, he hardly sees this as his only available option. David J. Williams has isolated no 
fewer than 85 distinct metaphors in Paul's writing, many of which are applied to Christ. 15 
As Scot Me Knight points out, often the determining factor in Paul's selection of a meta-
phor seems to be less an overarching idea than the particular metaphor's functionality in 
the moment. 16 
Paul did not limit himself to penal imagery when discussing the atonement. Like-
wise, penal substitution as presently held is a relative latecomer to church history. While 
penal language was present in the earliest church atonement formulations, it did not 
dominate. With roots in Anselm's theory of the atonement as "satisfaction" of God dating 
back to the 11th century, penal substitution as we know it did not come to flower until, 
depending upon one's perspective, either the early Protestant Refonners, including Cal-
14 Joel B. Green, "Kaleidescope Approach" in The Nature of the Atonement: Four 
Views, 115. 
15 David J. Williams, Paul's Metaphors: Their Context and Character (Peabody 
MA: Hendrickson Pubishers, 2003). 
16 Scot McKnight, 52. 
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vin, or 19th century American theologians, of whom Princeton's Charles Hodge would be 
the chief representative. The uncertainty of its origin in its present form arises because, 
while Calvin and the early reformers used some of the same language of penal substitu-
tion, it is debatable that they used these terms in the same way as the more recent theolo-
gians. 17 Regardless of its origins, penal substitution became the dominant theory in 
Western Protestantism in the 19th and 20th centuries. 18 In the Eastern church, while penal 
language appears occasionally, the emphasis is much more on identification vis-a-vis Ire-
neaus with the incarnation understood to be the key to atonement as the cross. 19 
Mark Baker and Joel Green, among others, argue that it is not surprising that pe-
nal substitution came to the fore in the late Enlightenment period. They state, "Hodge ex-
plains the penal substitutionary model in a way that makes it appear self-evident that God 
must act according to late-nineteenth-century American notions of justice."20 This, cou-
pled with the Enlightenment's emphasis upon the autonomous self, makes penal substitu-
tion a seemingly perfectly appropriate theory for a Western Enlightenment context. That 
self-evident nature, however, has caused its adherents then to read penal substitution back 
17 Peter Schmeichen, 37-45. Schmiechen stresses that, for Calvin, Christ's death is 
not an act of retributive justice and that salvation is achieved through the obedience of 
Chirst, both in life and death. This is in contrast to saying that salvation is being achieved 
through blood required retributively in penal substitution. 
1 8 It should be noted that this not the case in all Protestant streams. Anabaptists, 
for example, have typically not been adherents of penal substitution have tended more 
toward Christus Victor or Moral Exemplar theories of the atonement. 
19 John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Semi-
nary Press, 1985). This book has served as my introduction to Eastern theology and Stan-
ley Grenz considered it to be a definitive Eastern response to Barth and Rahner in the last 
half of the 20th Century. 
20 Joel B. Green and Mark D. Baker, Recovering the Scandal of the Cross (Down-
ers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2000), 147. 
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into, as it were, all of Church history and into the biblical texts themselves. We shall later 
discuss the appropriateness of this reading. 
Reading out of focus, from two directions. One of the touchstones of penal sub-
stitution is that God's justice is immutable. This is so much the case that while it main-
tains that God perfectly holds love and justice in tension,21 penal substitution "eliminates 
the tension by affirming justice as the only significant and functional divine attribute. "22 
It has been argued that, for Hodge, love was accidental to the nature of God; justice was 
not.23 In other words, "God can save sinners by sending his Son; but he doesn't have to 
do so,"24 since this might imply some limitation on God's sovereignty. This fits nicely 
with the British/ American conception of blind justice, a justice almost apart from God 
that seems to make requirements upon God in a binding way. Yet why should God's na-
ture of justice be any more binding that God's nature of love? This reading of biblical 
texts with a modern Enlightenment sense of abstract and absolute justice affects how pe-
nal substitution reads virtually all of the biblical texts related to the atonement. 
Just as, I believe, penal substitution reads back into the texts, particularly those of 
Paul, a modem conception of justice that is not necessarily present in the texts, it makes a 
21 This is a problematic assertion in its own right. Can anything in God's nature be 
"in tension" with another part of God's nature? Would it be more appropriate to say that 
justice flows from God's loving nature (as I will assert in my thesis) or that in God's tran-
scendence love and justice are not at odds or in need of being held in tension but only ap-
pear to be so due to our finite minds? 
22 Schmeichen, 11 0. 
23 Gary Deddo, "Issues in Contemporary Evangelical Theology" Lecture (Colo-
rado Springs, CO: Fuller Theological Seminary, Colorado Extension, October 19, 2007). 
Deddo was contrasting the theology of Hodge with that ofT.F. Torrance. 
24Jiirgen Moltmonn, The Trinity and the Kingdom (San Francisco, CA: Harper & 
Row, 1981), 115. 
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similar error in reading forward to Paul from the Old Testament. The key issue here is the 
nature of sacrifice in the life of Israel and its relationship with God. 
Defenders of penal substitution generally stress that sacrifice in the Old Testa-
ment did not have the capricious feed the angry god nature of other ancient pagan relig-
ions. They are correct. That said, it is hard to see how their presentation of sacrifice and 
the nature of God in the Old Testament supports their point. I will here quote Thomas 
Schreiner at some length: 
Those who sin face the retributive judgment of God .... The theme of judgment 
permeates the Old Testament. ... Scripture regularly teaches that God is personally 
angry at sinners .... 25 [And later] Reflect on the violence of the activity (OT sacri-
fice): the blood, the entrails, and the goriness of it all. The death of the animals 
shows that the penalty for sin is death. When we are told that the sacrifices are a 
soothing aroma, this image indicates that they satisfy God's wrath, that they ap-
h. 26 pease IS anger. 
At the root of these quotations, and the sentiments that they reflect, is the convic-
tion that, for Israel, it was the death of the sacrifice that turned away wrath, God's wrath. 
This is a God "who is angry and alienated by human sin, (and) requires something to ap-
pease divine anger before showing favor to the sinner. ,m The sacrificed animal becomes 
the object of God's wrath and only the shedding of blood can turn away anger. The vio-
lence of the sacrifice is seen as retributive: a just punishment for the wrong committed. 
25 Schreiner, 78, 79. 
26 Schreiner, 83. 
27 Bernhard Anderson, Contours of Old Testament Theology (Mi1meapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 1999), 120. 
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A few issues with this position immediately present themselves. Ironically, a 
prominent proponent of penal substitution, Leon Morris, pithily illustrates one of the 
chief. In speaking of the Old Testament Law, and with it the sacrificial system, he states: 
Law and Grace are mutually exclusive as ways of salvation. The conclusion is 
plain. The Law had its place in the purposes of God, but that place was not the 
bringing of salvation. God has made that abundantly clear in his dealings with 
Abraham that the only way is the way of Grace. Nothing can alter that, certainly 
not the Law. The Law was 430 years too late [emphasis mine]. 28 
Statements like this, coupled with both statements in scripture of God's desire for 
mercy and acknowledgement of God over sacrifice29 and the numerous instances in both 
the Old and New Testaments where forgiveness is granted to individuals in the absence 
of sacrifice, call in question the "non-negotiable" nature of "blood for life"30 required in 
penal substitution. It is striking in Morris' case that this profoundly astute observation, 
that Abraham and his descendents were put in and remained in relationship with God for 
430 years before the sacrificial system came into being, does not then show itself more 
significantly in his presentation of penal substitution. 
Additionally, Leviticus 5:11 indicates that, in the case of the poorest of the poor, a 
blood sacrifice is not required at all; a grain sacrifice will suffice since that is all that can 
be afforded. Colin Gunton, citing J.S. Whale, helpfully (and ironically) notes, "(This) is 
28 Leon Morris, The Atonement, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1983), 
36. 
29 Hosea 6:6 and Micah 6:8 serve as examples. 
30 The statement, "the life is in the blood" refers to blood being adequate payment 
for guilt (retributive justice) or if it is an offering or oblation. Larry Shelton provides an 
extensive argument for the latter understanding in Chapter 5 of Cross and Covenant. This 
will be taken up in the next section. 
13 
very important in demonstrating that sacrifice does not carry with it any connotations of 
vengeance or punishment: 'You cannot punish a cupful of barley. "'31 
How then is retributive violence at play here? And, is retributive justice even pos-
sible? Schmiechen argues that retributive violence is illusory. 
In what sense can imprisonment or even capital punishment restore health 
or lost life? If this then, is the case in human justice, in what sense can retribution 
be applied to the issue of atonement? If the punishment cannot equal the offense 
that leaves us with the idea that the punishment per se is somehow satisfying 
to God.32 
This is consistent with Bernhard Anderson's assertion that, in Leviticus, the sacrificial 
system serves to: 
Express God's readiness to establish good relations. They are ritual ways of ex-
pressing belief in God's power to overcome the sin that distances people from 
God so that they may live in communion or fellowship with God. Accordingly, in 
the Priestly (Levitical) view the sacrificial system is a means of grace that God 
has provided. 33 
This question, "Is the sacrificial primarily a means to 'appease' or 'propitiate' the 
angry God, or is it a graceful provision of a God who has already put Israel into relation-
ship from Abraham onward?" seems of utmost importance for the validity or lack of va-
lidity of penal substitution. While most penal adherents might well say "both/and" it 
seems as if they fundamentally support more of the former and not the latter. Starting 
with an assumption that sacrifice is primarily about appeasing God's wrath, it is therefore 
easy to see how the death of Jesus and the New Testament writers' discussion of it is 
clearly seen in similar terms. 
31 Gunton, 120. 
32 Schmiechen, 39. 
33 Anderson, 118,_ 
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In this document, I will demonstrate how others propose means in which cove-
nantal relationality is the driving interpretation of the Old Testament while still taking sin 
and God's justice seriously. I will also argue that a potentially paradigmatic metaphor for 
the atonement is in fact embedded in the Old Testament: the story of Hosea and his wife 
Gomer. 
God constrained. In an attempt to refute the accusation that penal substitution 
presents a vengeful, angry God, it is often argued that God's justice or God's holiness 
constrain or require God to demand death or punishment. While careful attention is given 
to declaring that this justice and holiness is God's and that they are part of who God is, 
positing that God is controlled by justice seems to create a sense in which justice takes on 
a character that is either separate from God. It seems to make claims upon God or at least 
functions as a characteristic of God that controls or rules over other attributes of God. 
Proponents are quick to argue that this is not the case. John Stott states, "We must cer-
tainly remain dissatisfied whenever the atonement is presented as a necessary satisfaction 
either of God's 'law' or of God's 'honour' in so far as these are objectified as existing in 
some way apart from him."34 
states: 
Trouble in the person of God. Larry Shelton, referencing Hemy Spaulding, 
the satisfaction and penal theories of the atonement, which are virtually ubiqui-
tous in evangelical circles, have reflected a deficient Trinitarianism in assuming 
that that the 'real problem in the atonement is with God .... Inevitably this pits Je-
sus against the Father. '35 
34 John R. W. Stott, The Cross a_[ Christ, 120. 
35 Larry Shelton, Cross and Covenant (Tyrone, GA: Paternoster Press, 2006), 22. 
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This succinctly articulates what I believe is the single most insurmountable defi-
ciency of penal substitution. It seems, unavoidably, to put the action of one member of 
the Trinity against the other. As was expressed in the initial summary of the theory, ad-
herents are anxious to say this is not so: "The Father, because of his love for human be-
ings, sent his Son (who offered himself willingly and gladly) to satisfy God's justice, so 
that Christ took the place of sinners. "36 Or John Stott replies to the charge by stating: 
Such crude interpretations of the cross still emerge in some of our evangelical il-
lustrations, as when we describe Christ as coming to rescue us from the judgment 
of God, or when we portray him as the whipping bol7 who is punished instead of 
the real culprit. The whole notion of a compassionate Christ inducing a reluctant 
God to take action on our behalf founders on the fact of God's love. 38 
Others reply to the charge by cataloging at length all of the examples of how, in 
scripture, God the Father displays himself to be loving?9 I believe this clouds the issue. 
To say, "Look at all the ways God is loving," does not take away the fact that your model 
primarily describes God as wrathful. To illustrate, it is as if I were confronted with the 
accusation, "You beat your wife," and I respond by saying, "That's ridiculous. Let me tell 
you all of the loving things I have said to her over the last year." It very well may be true 
that I have said all those things, but that in no way addresses the truth or falsity of the 
charge that I have been abusive to my wife. Likewise, to answer that penal substitution 
36 Schreiner, 67. 
37 Is it possible to read this sentence without Mel Gibson's 'The Passion of the 
Christ' coming to mind? I don't ask that to attack Gibson. I sincerely believe his desire 
was to produce a devotional homage to Christ. Still, the idea that "the more blood the 
more beautiful is our salvation" abounds. 
38 Stott, 150. 
39 I. Howard Marshall, 52-65. 
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posits a fundamentally angry God whose hand must be stayed by Jesus by listing verses 
elsewhere that argue for God's love, if anything, serves to make the point of the opposi-
tion: that penal substitution, in this regard, is not consistent to the nature of God. 
While Stott and others admit that "crude representations" of penal substitution do 
suggest a God-Son dynamic that is at least sub-Trinitarian, I believe the questions must 
be asked, "If a significant number, and perhaps a majority of a model's proponents, pre-
sent it in an inappropriate, if not dangerous, way, might there be some intrinsic flaw in 
the model? If only professional theologians (and I'm not sure I'd be willing to concede 
this point) can get it right, is this truly the best model available?" 
A Trinitarian alternative in view of the cross is offered by Miroslav Volf and Jiir-
gen Moltmann. I will deal with their positions more later, but quote them here at length as 
a counterpoint to penal substitution's view of the Trinity. 
For the very nature of the triune God is reflected in the cross of Christ. Inversely, 
the cross of Christ is etched in the heart of the triune God; Christ's passion is 
God's passion .... When the Trinity turns toward the world, the Son and the Spirit 
become, in Irenaeus' s beautiful image, the two arms of God by which humanity 
was made and taken into God's embrace .... When God sets out to embrace the 
enemy, the result is the cross.40 
Echoing the Christ Hymn of Phil. 2, Moltmann says: 
When the crucified Jesus is called the 'image ofthe invisible God', the meaning is 
that this is God, and God is like this. God is not greater than he is in this humilia-
tion. God is not more glorious than he is in this self-surrender. God is not more 
powerful than he is in this helplessness .... The nucleus of everything that Christi-
anity says about 'God' is to be found in this Christ event. The Christ event on the 
cross is a God event.41 
40 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace. (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 
1996), 127, 128-9. 
41 Jiirgen Moltmonn, The Cruc~fzed God (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1974), 
205. 
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I will later argue that this view, with its view of all of the Trinity participating in the 
event of the cross, deals with the Trinitarian difficulties intrinsic in penal substitution. 
Getting the cart before the horse. All of these issue cumulatively point to what I 
believe is the fundamental problem with penal substitution. It takes that which is primar-
ily a relational issue-humanity's broken relationship with God, with one another, and 
with creation, and the cost required to restore relationship-and shifts it all into the world 
of legal abstraction, particularly retributive justice. "It structures the relationship between 
God and humankind in terms of an ahistorical, abstract legal formula."42 Without a doubt, 
legal terms and concepts are at play in scripture, particularly in Paul. I would assert, how-
ever, that these metaphors serve to illumine or inform the larger, dominant metaphor at 
I 1 . h" 43 p ay, covenant re at10ns Ips. 
I. Howard Marshall feels that it is most appropriate to think of God's wrath and 
the atonement in terms of retributive justice: 
.. .If a person causes somebody to suffer, then they should be made to suffer pro-
portionately to cancel out the original evil deed .... In some sense, the crime has 
not been 'paid for' until the criminal has suffered something comparable to the 
suffering they have caused. This is most clearly so in the case of murder where 
murderers are subjected to loss of their own life or deprived of liberty for a so-
called life sentence; the thought is that a life must be paid for a life. Until the pen-
alty has been paid, the guilty party remains guilty.44 
Marshall admits that this kind of retributive justice "does not do any good to the 
victim or others affected by the crime. The victim's relatives may cry out for vengeance, 
42 Dennis Weaver, Atonement and Violence, ed. John Sanders (Nashville, TN: Ab-
ingdon Press, 2006), 6. 
43 This argument here follows closely that of Shelton's Cross and Covenant, 
Colin Gunton's The Actuality of Atonement and T.F. Torrance's The Mediation of Christ 
(Colorado Springs, CO: Helmers & Howard, 1992). 
44 Marshall, 27. 
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but it is hard to see how making the offender suffer actually does any good to the persons 
who have suffered."45 However, he still feels retributive justice is warranted as a motiva-
tion for God in the atonement.46 Personally, I am at a loss as to how to explain, both ei-
ther in a human legal sense or in a cosmic spiritual sense, how "until the penalty has been 
paid, the guilty party remains guilty" can have applicability in taking the life of the of-
fender. How is it that the now executed murderer is actually free from guilt? If the mur-
derer is now free from guilt, in the eyes of the law, of what good is it? They are now 
dead! 
Retributive justice is built around the idea that somehow a proportional penalty 
can be paid for wrong done. "Punishment should equal the crime." While this may be 
possible in petty crimes, is it possible in larger offenses? "In serious acts of violence, 
punishment does not compensate or make actual restitution. In what sense can imprison-
ment or even capital punishment restore health or lost life?"47 One thinks of the angry 
surviving families crying for justice in the execution of the murderer of a loved one. And 
yet, if the execution takes place, do they feel relief? Do they feel restored? Is their loss 
removed? 
One is left to wonder if retributive justice is merely a tragic myth. In essence, 
"you have inflicted pain on me and it will 'satisfy' me to inflict pain in return." Echoes of 
this can be seen in Mel Gibson's popular "Passion of the Christ" and its relentless focus 
45 Ibid., 28. 
46 In referring to Romans 13:4 he asserts that the "magistrate is God's agent to 
carry out vengeance/punishment or retribution on wrongdoers" on p. 14. This argument is 
furthered elsewhere as well. 
47 Schmiechen, 39. 
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upon the physical suffering of Jesus in his scourging and crucifixion. Here, the inference 
seems to be that it is great suffering that achieves atonement, and that somehow, it is pro-
found pain that God requires. This view neglects other key roles suffering can play. Shel-
ton states that this, "Western tendency to view suffering as synonymous with punishment 
distorts the priestly understanding of identification and participation (by Jesus, the great 
high priest) in the human experience.'48 Finally, as Joel Green points out: 
Does the transfer of guilt satisfy the demands of justice? Given the antropathy at 
work in attributing this sort of anger to Yahweh, can we so easily escape the real-
ity that redirecting anger at an innocent party does not (or at least need not) return 
the guilty party to good graces?49 
Fixing a phantom and a limited vision. My final concern with penal substitution 
is that it addresses what is wrong in the self-contained individual. "I have a sin problem. 
Christ died for my sins. I owe a debt I cannot pay." The penal model seems virtually ob-
sessed with dealing with the sin of the individual before God, in a legal sense. 
I struggle with this on two fronts. The first is that it seems to lack the all-
encompassing nature of the atonement expressed in verses like II Corinthians 5: 19, "God 
was in Christ reconciling the world to himself' or Colossians 1: 19,20, " For God was 
pleased to have all his fullness dwell in him, and through him to reconcile all things, 
whether things on earth or things in heaven, by making peace through his blood, shed on 
the cross. " This universal or cosmic dimension to the saving work of Christ seems 
wholly missing from penal substitution as it is often articulated. This is where models 
like Christus Victor and a covenantal understanding of the atonement offer a helpful cor-
rective. 
48 Shelton, 77. 
49 Green, 112. 
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My second concern is with how penal substitution and, in reality, most all of the 
modern world, conceives of the self In my thesis, I will argue at some length that the 
Modern Enlightenment has created a bounded, interior sense of selfhood, a self "in isola-
tion and abstracted from communal imbeddedness."50 This self that Martin Buber says, 
because it is incapable of relating communally to others, is the "detached I" which "is 
transformed from substantial fullness (true personhood) to the functional one-
dimensionality of a subject that experiences and uses objects (things AND others as 
things).51 In doing so, two things occur; all others become its to be used and manipulated 
and the self becomes a "golem, an animated clod without a soul."52 The selfhas become 
"masterful, bounded and empty."53 
This bounded, interior self is the self addressed in penal substitution. What is 
wrong is a problem interior to the individual. The cross fixes that problem. The stain of 
guilt is removed. 
In viewing the atonement in this manner, penal substitution returns to the problem 
of replacing a fundamentally relational issue with an interior abstract one, only this time 
from the other direction. How fortunate that God's primary concern in the atonement is 
addressing an interior defect, individual sinfulness, and its interior consequences, stand-
ing guilty and judged before Justice, because that is exactly how the bounded, interior 
50 Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self( Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 4. 
51 Martin Buber, I and Thou. (New York, NY: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1971), 
80. 
52 Ibid., 114. 
53Philip Cushman, Constructing the Self, Constructing America. (New York, NY: 
DeCapo Press, 2002), 79. 
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self sees itself. Atonement allows the self to have corrected that which is interiorly wrong 
with the self. God now enables the self to be truly whole, interiorly so. 
I would argue that as God is more concerned with the reconciliation of broken re-
lationship than with the satisfaction of abstract justice, the self is, in actuality, not 
bounded and interior. As Buber famously suggests, selfhood is attained in relationship, in 
I and Thou. If this is correct, and I will argue more on this later, then penal substitution 
does not truly address what is wrong with me, that sin has destroyed my basic person-
hood rendering me incapable of the right relationships (with God, others, creation) 
needed to constitute a self. 
Christus Victor 
First articulated as a formal theory of atonement by Gustav Aulen54 and tracing 
its roots to Ireneus in early church history,55 Christus Victor often stands as the primary 
alternative to penal substitution. Like penal substitution, it clearly posits that God, 
through Christ, performed a saving act that humanity is incapable of performing on its 
own. However, whereas penal substitution focuses upon Christ providing a substitute to 
receive the just punishment from God that human sin deserves, the emphasis in Christus 
Victor is upon Christ rescuing humanity from oppressive powers (configured variously as 
sin, the law, powers and dominions, demonic powers, Satan, or death)56 or, similarly de-
feating these same powers. Whereas penal substitution focuses upon addressing issues 
54 Gustaf Aulen, Christus Victor, trans. A.G. Hebert (London, UK: S.P.C.K., 
1931). 
55 Schmiechen, 125. 
56 Ibid., 124. 
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interior to the self, Christus Victor is concerned with addressing issues exterior to the self 
that hold individuals and all of humanity in thrall. 
Reading the life and work of Jesus through the lens of Israel's Exodus story pro-
vides a conceptual paradigm for Christus Victor. 57 N.T. Wright, for example, says that a 
failure to see Jesus in light of the biblical account of deliverance, beginning in Egypt and 
weaving through all of scripture, renders the work of Jesus unintelligible. God's state-
ment to Moses, "I have indeed seen the misery of my people in Egypt. I have heard them 
crying out because of their slave drivers, and I am concerned about their suffering. So I 
have come down to rescue them ... "58 provides a synopsis of the motivation and suggests 
the coming action of God. The Exodus story here prefigures and frames all of God's sal-
vation work in history and Jesus' work in particular. 
How is this rescue brought about? Various views exist. The recapitulation of 
fallen humanity, ransom paid, Satan deceived, and Evil (Satan) defeated were primary 
theories in the early Church. 59 In recapitulation, Christ participates with us in our suffer-
ing and we participate in his death, resurrection and ascension, hence being re-formed, 
free from the destructive effects of sin. The incarnation of Jesus plays a much larger role 
in recapitulation than in penal substitution. The concepts of participation and identifica-
57 N. T. Wright, The Problem of Jesus (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 
1999). 
58 Exodus, 3:7, 8a. 
59 Shelton, 160. 
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tion are fundamental. In Irenaeus' words, "He became like us that we might become like 
him." 60 
Another approach to rescue is that Christ served as a ransom payment to secure 
our salvation: "You were bought with a price. "61 But to whom is this price paid? Shelton 
sees Origen as the classic early commentator on this point and summarizes his view in 
this way: 
Origen suggested that the ransom cannot be paid to God but to Satan, since he has 
humanity in his power. The ransom payment Satan seeks is the life of Christ. 
Christ gives himself in exchange for the life of humanity; but Satan then finds that 
Christ cannot be contained by death-he breaks free from Satan's control, thus 
vanquishing death and rendering it no longer the master of humanity. 62 
A vivid and popular example of this theory would be Asian's death and resurrec-
tion in C.S. Lewis' The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe. There the sinful deeds of a 
human (the traitor Edmond) have made his life forfeit to the White Witch (Satan). The 
great lion Asian (Jesus) offers to die in his stead, recognizing that the Witch's claim to a 
life is legitimate but knowing of a "deeper magic" than the Witch's which allows a life 
freely offered to triumph over death. 
In this story can be seen a central and, for many, troubling feature of ransom theo-
ries of the atonement, deception. It is similar to Gregory of Nyssa's famous metaphor of 
Jesus' humanity serving as the fish that Satan swallows whole only to discover that the 
hook, Jesus' divinity, has trapped him. While modern sensibilities find such illustrations 
60 Ibid., quoting Irenaeus 162. 
61 I Corinthians 6:20 
62 Shelton, 166. 
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problematic or even "grotesque,"63 Shelton states that Christus Victor and its variations 
"provide rich resources for creative communication of the atonement to a postmodem 
audience sensitized to the reality of spiritual forces. "64 
Indeed, in modern/postmodem contexts, Christus Victor has proven to be a very 
attractive paradigm for people who have experienced oppression, whether political, eco-
nomic, racial, or gender related. Beginning with Moltmann, liberation theologians, femi-
nist theologians, and spokespersons for the Civil Rights Movement have found rich soil 
in the categories of Christus Victor.65 "The appeal of liberation theology [Christus Vic-
tor] is to those who live in danger of losing hope because of oppressive forces .... Sins 
need to be forgiven, but people in bondage need to be liberated. "66 While these groups 
are often criticized, with justification, for tending to minimize, if not eliminate, individual 
responsibility for sin, surely they are correct in emphasizing the need for liberation. 
Speaking personally from my experience in youth ministry, when talking with a young 
person whose life has been a relentless cycle of abuse and emotional abandonment, the 
language of personal responsibility for sin and guilt deserving death in penal substitution 
seems at least inadequate if not bordering on abusive in its own right. As psychologists 
and sociologists increasingly paint a picture of the woundedness and emotional aban-
donment that most young people experience, it is not surprising that Christus Victor Ian-
63 Shelton, 161. Shelton here is summarizing others, not expressing his own opin-
ion. While he grants the concern that deception is a characteristic untenable with the na-
ture of God, he is sympathetic to that which these images describe. 
64 Ibid., 172. 
65 Schmiechen, Ch. 4., Shelton. Ch. 9. 
66 Schmiechen, 164. 
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guage might be increasingly popular with those ministering to youth in the affluent sub-
urbs as well as blighted cities.67 
I suspect that a middle way regarding personal responsibility for sin and cosmic 
or structural powers of evil is warranted. If penal substitution is "reduced to the removal 
of (personal) guilt,"68 it is also likely true that Christus Victor can tend to make the oppo-
site mistake: 
If the great strength of liberation theologies is the critique of injustice and a vision 
of freedom, all based on God's preferential option for the oppressed, herein lies 
its vulnerability .... They require more precision in speaking of areas of responsi-
bility and guilt. 69 
Schmiechen here is correct, both in his noting above that "people need to be liberated," 
not just forgiven, but, conversely, that it is also a mistake to swing the pendulum so far 
toward liberation that personal repentance and forgiveness are obscured. Shelton sug-
gests, as we will discuss further, that the possibility exists to fold these two together in a 
helpful synthesis. 70 
Moral Influence 
Generally attributed initially to late 11 th_early l21h century theologian Peter 
Abelard, the moral-influence model finds the significance of the cross less in achieving 
the forgiveness of sins and more in providing the motivation, impetus, and model for hu-
67 Chap Clark, a veteran of youth ministry and a child psychologist and professor 
at Fuller Theological Seminary has written a profoundly influential book regarding the 
emotional abandonment of virtually all youth in modern culture, Hurt (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2004). 
68 Shelton, 169. 
69 Schmiechen, 165. 
70 Shelton, 172. 
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manity to live a God-centered life. He suggests that the cross can not be "necessary" to 
bring the forgiveness of sins because "if Jesus pronounced forgiveness of people's sins 
before he went to the cross, then if by the same grace God wanted to forgive others, 
would that not be possible?"71 Rather, Jesus' life and death are "a demonstration of God's 
love that moves sinners to repent and love God."72 Shelton argues, "The spirit of obedi-
ence and love in Christ's sufferings, rather than their penalizing nature, form their a ton-
ing value. His perfect expression of repentance on behalf of humanity serves to demon-
strate God's love and forgiveness."73 
If one of the concerns with penal substitution is that it "implies little or nothing 
about ethics," positing an "a-ethical atonement image,"74 the moral-influence model suf-
fers from the opposite concern. Here, the primary purpose and result of the death of Jesus 
is to lead us into a virtuous, Christ-imitating life. Like Christus Victor, moral-influence 
theory addresses a weakness in penal substitution, but in many ways, replaces that weak-
ness with a new one. Moral-influence fails to take sin seriously enough. Stott states that, 
"it offers a superficial remedy because it has made a superficial diagnosis." 75 It tends to 
suggest that if properly motivated and guided, the human heart has the capability to leave 
a life of sin. This seems clearly to run against both the description of the human heart in 
scripture and the personal experience of any of who have tried on our own effort to ask, 
71 Green and Baker, 137. 
72 Ibid., 137. 
73 Shelton, 207. 
74 9 Weaver, . 
75 Stott, 220. 
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"What would Jesus do?" and to do likewise. As Philippians 2 clearly suggests, we are 
encouraged to take great guidance and inspiration from the life and death of Jesus and the 
moral-influence theory does bring this out in ways that penal substitution does not. Still, 
at the end of the day, it does seem accurate to declare that, on its own, it is both an inade-
quate accounting of scripture and an inadequate description of how we actually are. 
Girard and Mimetic Violence 
Literary critic and cultural anthropologist Rene· Girard has, over the last decades 
of the 20111 century, had a profound impact upon understandings of the cross.76 According 
to Girard, human desires are driven by a sort of jealousy and imitation of that which an-
other has. Cain relative to Abel would be an example of this mimetic rivalry and just as it 
leads Cain to murder Abel, mimetic rivalry leads humanity to ever increasing spirals of 
violence. As James says, "What causes fights and quarrels among you? Don't they come 
from your desires that battle within you? You want something but don't get it. You kill 
and covet, but you cannot have what you want. You quarrel and fight. "77 
As this violence spirals out of control, society seeks to assuage the violence. 
Boersma summarizes Girard: 
The group subconsciously looks for a way out and finds this in a scapegoat. 
Girard views the 'scapegoat mechanism' as the identification of a particular indi-
vidual as the source of unrest, disorder, sickness or other societal ills .... The 
group is transferred into a mob and lets off steam against the victim, who be-
comes a substitute for the mimetic rivals .... Ironically, the scapegoat mechanism 
works. Once the crowd has vented its frustrations, its violent impulses subside, re-
sulting in peace and harmony. 78 
76 Hans Boersma, Violence, Hospitality and the Cross (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2004),133. 
77 James 4: 1-2a. 
78 Boersma, 13 7. 
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On many levels, Girard has correctly identified a powerful force in society. From 
Cain and Abel to Jewish pogroms to hatred of "gypsies" or racial strife to even the xeno-
phobic behaviors of countries today, this mimetic violence can be seen at play. 
For Girard, this also explains the death of Jesus. Jesus is the ultimate scapegoat. 
In this case he is not just the scapegoat of the Jews of 1st century Palestine, but also the 
scapegoat for all of the mimetic violence of humanity. This is possible because, for 
Girard, God himself allows himself to be the victim of human violence, in so doing "re-
vealing the futility of accomplishing reconciliation through the unjust scapegoating."79 
William Placher similarly argues, "what is different about the biblical narratives (as op-
posed to other mimetic histories), and above all, the story of Jesus, is that they expose the 
workings of the device and, therefore, disarm it. "80 
This ability to disarm is at least partially true. The centurion of Mark 15, viewing 
Jesus' death on the cross and proclaiming, "Surely this was the Son of God," seems to 
suggest it. Additionally, the success of passive- resistance movements led by Gandhi and 
Martin Luther King Jr. seem to have in at least some part been due to the exposure of the 
violence and scapegoating of the dominant culture. One thinks of the scenes of the bridge 
at Selma or white adults yelling obscenities at black elementary-school children flashed 
across the country on TV. In fact, these examples speak to one of the great strengths of 
this view of the atonement. Shelton states that it, "assumes that the atonement calls the 
Christian to recapitulate the sacrificial attitude of Christ through participation in living 
79 Shelton, 212. 
80 William Placher, Narratives of a Vulnerable God (Lousville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox, 1994),119. 
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out the consequences of the atoning work of Christ in the world."81 It is a view of the 
atonement that really does call Christians to "take up their own crosses." 
As helpful as this mimetic insight is, it is not without significant problems. Ste-
phen Finlan, who is in many ways sympathetic to Girard's reading of scripture, states: 
As an anthropological theory, the fatal flaw in Girard's proposal is the reduction-
ist insistence that all culture and religion are founded on one thing, the scapegoat-
ing mechanism. Even if it can be shown that there is such a mechanism in socie-
ties around the world, that would only prove its existence, not its primacy in so-
cial formation. 82 
As is often the case, it seems inappropriate to reduce things as vast as all human societies 
or all religions to any one idea or principle.83 
Additionally, central to the effectiveness of Girard's treatment of the atonement is 
the belief that to thoroughly expose the futility of human violence through scapegoating 
is enough to end it. Girard sees "salvation as knowledge."84 Is this true? Is it adequate? 
Does knowledge of what I've done, or am doing, truly give me the strength to stop? Hu-
man history since the cross would seem to suggest otherwise. 
Finlan also argues that Girard's analysis focuses so much attention on the role of 
violence in society that it misses all other realities. 
If there is no other basis to human religion than violence and dissembling, then 
humanity is doomed .... If human beings around the world and in their nonbiblical 
religions had not learned anything about justice, honesty, compassion, reciprocity, 
81 Shelton, 212. 
82 Stephen Finlan, Options on Atonement in Christian Thought (Collegeville, MN: 
Liturgical Press, 2007), 106. 
83 Although, as we shall soon see, Finlan makes much the same mistake only sub-
stituting "spiritual evolution" for the scapegoating mechanism. 
84 Boersma,142. 
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compromise, repentance, repair, afterlife, spirituality or perfection of motivation, 
how could the Gentiles ever be attracted to the Gospel?85 
These concerns illustrate that, while it is a provocative theory that may in fact explain 
much of how humans function in societies and likely has much to say to atonement the-
ology, Girard's analysis cannot be seen as adequate in itself. Mark Heim, who builds 
most of his extensive work, Savedfrom Sacr~fice, around Girard's ideas, admits as much. 
I agree that if taken as an exclusive account of Christian theology or even as an 
exhaustive account of the cross, Girard's writing can be faulted for tending to-
ward the impression that all that is needed in Christ's work is a particularly dra-
matic demonstration of a truth we need to learn, as opposed to a divine act by 
whose power we are transformed. 86 
Stephen Fin/an and Incarnation INSTEAD OF atonement. 
I would like to conclude this section with a look at the work of Stephen Finlan as 
an example of someone trying to do theology that takes the divinity of Jesus seriously 
and takes, at least on many levels, the authority of scripture seriously, while rejecting the 
atonement as an essential Christian doctrine. Other examples could be given of persons 
who wish to be called Christians but who reject the atonement altogether,87 but Finlan 
strikes me as different in that he doesn't arrive at his position by dismissing the biblical 
texts out of hand; rather, he radically reinterprets them. 
Two ideas are foundational to Finlan's approach: a familial view of God and 
God's interactions with humanity and a "growth hermeneutic" applied to all of scripture. 
Finlan asks, "If we drop atonement, do we lose all these [divinity of Christ, saving pur-
85 F inlan, 1 07. 
86 Mark Heim, Saved from Sacrifice. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 13. 
87 Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer or radical feminist theologians would be examples. 
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pose of the incarnation, God's concern for humanity] essential ideas? If we drop the con-
cept of the violence of God, will we cease to believe in God at all ?"88 
He answers, no--if we replace the violent God with the loving father God. Fin-
Ian's answer to the violence of the atonement is, "We must return to the response of Je-
sus, 'Fear not, little flock, for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the king-
dom. "'89 This, for him, is not just a part of the message of Jesus, it "is the heart of the 
simple and stunning message of Jesus."90 In an extended quotation that speaks to this pri-
ority of a loving parent as well as his evolutionary emphasis, Finlan states, "A good Fa-
ther is not a slave owner, a stern judge, or even a king, but 'the Father himself loves you' 
(John 16:27). God planted us here to grow us. There is a fundamental contradiction be-
tween the atonement metaphor and the family metaphor."91 
As mentioned earlier, Finlan does not want to throw out scripture, or even dismiss 
the validity of church history. How does he hope to avoid this while taking such a dismis-
sive stance toward the atonement? He does this by positing a "hermeneutic of growth, a 
way of understanding progress and regression in religious ideation."92 In a statement not 
lacking a fair bit of condescension, he states, "Perhaps the best option with outmoded 
atonement concepts, is to see them as a phase of childish construction that Jesus endures 
88 Finlan, 127. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 128. 
92 lbid.,126. 
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as he patiently waits for his children to grow up. "93 In a way that mirrors the work of Mi-
chael Polanyi,94 Finlan does not see "new theological insight" as invalidating past ideas, 
but, rather, moving through and building upon them. For example, while Einstein's in-
sights regarding physics run counter to Newton's, they would not have been possible 
without climbing upon Newton's philosophical shoulders. Finlan's picture of God is a 
God who has slowly been doling out revelation in ever evolving insights as humanity is 
ready for them. "Who says we are forced to either deify or vilify the past? There is an-
other choice between fundamentalism or Marcionism. We may begin to allow our know!-
edge of God to grow, 'first the stalk, then the head, then the full grain of the head' (Mark 
4:28)."95 
For Finlan, Christianity should replace its focus upon the atonement with a focus 
upon the doctrine of the Incarnation. Repeatedly returning to the "Hosea Principle,"96 that 
God "desires steadfast love and not sacrifice,"97 he posits the Incarnation as the key con-
cept of Christianity. He reads Ireneaus' famous dictum, "Jesus Christ became what we 
are in order that we might become what he himself is," to be a statement solely about the 
Incarnation. "Not atonement, but restoration andre-enabled participation in divinity are 
93 Ibid.,l25. 
94 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1958). 
95 Finlan,l25. 
96 Stephen Finlan, Problems with Atonement (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 
2005), 112. 
97 Hosea 6:6. 
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the pillars of reconciliation."98 In this sense, Finlan is proposing a position quite similar 
to moral-exemplar views of the atonement, except that here the exemplar lies in God's 
incarnating love, not in Jesus going to the cross. For Finlan, the cross is an accident that 
has mistakenly been infused with meaning through church history. "There are quite a few 
parables and remarks of Jesus that indicate that he did not think it was God's will that he 
should be murdered ... He (Jesus) simply did not preach a sacrificial theology."99 
While one appreciates Finlan's attempts to remain biblically oriented in spite of 
his profound dis-ease with atonement, and while he is correct in stating that the Incarna-
tion has been an underdeveloped doctrine, dwelling in the shadows of atonement theol-
ogy100 it seems he vastly overstates his case. To argue that the atonement is in no way a 
"necessary" doctrine to Christian orthodoxy 101 seems to require an enormous amount of 
either dismissing or radically reinterpreting both scripture and 2000 years of Church 
teaching. Finlan' s atonement theology is intrinsically tied up with a belief that all atone-
ment theology posits a barbaric God who demands appeasement. 102 I believe this unfairly 
conflates some views of the atonement with all views of the atonement. 
98 Finlan, Problems with Atonement 121. 
99 Ibid., 109. 
100 Ibid., 4. Finlan makes much of this case upon the fact that the early Church 
councils went to great lengths to define the divinity/humanity of Christ, an issue of the 
Incarnation, while giving little attention to ideas of atonement. He feels that the Church 
quickly lost this incarnational emphasis and needs to return to it. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid., 3. 
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Conclusion 
Each of the approaches to the atonement discussed thus far has recommending 
characteristics. Each, in its own ways, draws attention to important ideas about God, the 
human condition, and how the two relate in the person of Jesus. At the same time, each 
has deficiencies that make it untenable as the definitive approach to the atonement. Given 
that, one is faced with two options-either, a "kaleidoscope approach" 103 that draws ele-
ments from each, or, perhaps, another more fundamental paradigm that could draw from 
the strengths of each while avoiding their weaknesses. In the following section, I will 
posit that a familial/covenantal/relational orientation to the atonement provides just such 
a framework. 
103 Joel B. Green, "Kaleidoscopic View" in The Nature of the Atonement: Four 
Views. 
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Section 3: My Thesis 
Situational Framing of the Thesis 
During a week at a Young Life camp, the first three nights of the week will often 
feature talks that center upon our hunger for meaning, our sense of being fundamentally 
alone and our awareness of emptiness, and how Jesus interacts in the Gospels with indi-
viduals experiencing issues. These talks often profoundly resonate with students. The will 
express sentiments like, "That's exactly how my life feels all the time." 
The fourth and fifth nights present a significant change in approach and tone. 
Leaving the largely Gospel narrative based orientation of the first three days, the fourth 
night is a propositionally driven exposition of the doctrines of the fall, sin, and human-
ity's inability to address the issues of sin by our own efforts, often with little or no men-
tion in this talk of Jesus at all. The conversations on this night reflect a vastly different 
response from students. The range here can be profound, from apathy to confusion to 
rage. The apathetic and confused responses seem to come from the same root, "So what? 
This doesn't feel real to me. It doesn't fit how I see the world or live my life." The rage is 
different. These folks get it and are angry-at God and at the adults who brought them. 
"What the hell?! You brought us here and get us excited about how much God loves us 
and how Jesus cares for us and then all that is thrown out the window tonight with a God 
that is angry and is sending us to hell and there's nothing we can do about it. I hate this 
place!" 
The fifth night is the story of the cross of Jesus. "Hey, I know we left you in a 
really hard place last night, but now here's the rest of the story!" This night typically is a 
combination of a narrative telling of the crucifixion and continued propositional theologi-
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cal presentations trying to describe atonement. Responses to this evening are mixed. 
Some kids are profoundly moved and respond significantly. Others are moved but ask, "I 
still don't get it. How does something Jesus did fix all the stuff we talked about last 
night? Why would God ask Jesus to do that? Do I want to be reconciled to a God that 
would do that to Jesus?" 
The sixth night is a further explication of "What does all this mean?'' More often 
than not, the story of the Prodigal Son is told, with a pronounced emphasis upon the sup-
posed repentance of the son and some emphasis upon the loving movement of the father. 
This is the night that things typically come together for students. Often kids will say, 
"Now I get it." 
In Young Life, we tend to view nights four and five as The Gospel Presentation 
and deem everything else to be ancillary and of secondary importance. This seems only 
natural, given the evangelical propensity to see the propositions of penal substitution as 
the heart of the Gospel and to view abstract presentations of these propositions to be the 
most appropriate means to communicate them. After 20+ years of taking kids to camp, I 
have come to wonder why nights four and five, if they are the real crux of things, are so 
confusing and troubling to kids? Why do students respond so powerfully to the issues of 
the first three nights and again to the story of the Prodigal Son, in contrast? Could it be 
that on nights one to three and again on night six we are more accurately and effectively 
communicating the Gospel? Could it be that nights four and five, particularly in the way 
we describe sin and our emphasis here on propositional theology, are almost obstacles to 
effectively sharing the Gospel? Is there a way to maintain the centrality of the cross while 
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being less confusing and troubling to students? I believe a relationally centered view of 
the self and the atonement is that way. 
A plot in context 
In many evangelical circles, a popular evangelistic phrase is, "If you were the 
only person to ever live, Jesus would still have come to die for you." This is obviously a 
powerful statement. My fear, however, is that too often we treat the saving work of Jesus 
as if, functionally, this statement were actually the case. We talk and think about him only 
in terms of his coming and dying for me or for you, but always and only for individuals. 
We also think of him only in terms of his death. In the famous phrase, Jesus truly was the 
man born to die, but we have so focused upon his death that it is as if his life and who he 
was in his person is of little or no consequence. Finally, in framing our evangelism in this 
fashion, we rip Jesus out of any historical context and really do treat him as if his birth, 
life, death, and resurrection 2000 years ago could have happened anywhere and at any 
time as long as it happened for you and for me. In this first sub-point to my thesis, I 
would like to do a bit of re-contextualizing the saving work of Jesus. 
While this re-contextualizing project is not new, perhaps no one has championed 
it more passionately or skillfully in recent years than N. T. Wright. Wright argues that 
Jesus' self-understanding was intrinsically wrapped up in the history of Israel, in his Jew-
ishness. I quote him here at length: 
Jesus believed and acted upon two vital points, without which we will not even 
begin to understand what he was all about. These two points are foundational to 
everything I shall say from now on. First, he believed that the creator God had 
purposed from the beginning to address and deal with the problems within his 
creation through Israel. Israel was not just an 'example' of a nation under God; 
Israel was to be the means through which the world would be saved. 
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Second, Jesus believed ... that this vocation would be accomplished through Is-
rael's history reaching a great moment of climax, in which Israel herself would be 
saved from her enemies and through which the creator God, the covenant God, 
would at last bring his love and justice, his mercy and truth, to bear upon the 
whole world, bring renewal and healing to all creation. 104 
The argument of Wright's work, The Challenge of Jesus, is that Jesus literally 
embodies Israel's role in history relative to God and the world and simultaneously em-
bodies God's movement toward Israel and the world. Larry Shelton echoes this point in 
his discussion of hi/asterion in Romans 3:25 when he argues that rather than "sacrifice of 
atonement," hilasterion is better rendered mercy seat, or the "location where God is pre-
sent and may be safely approached."105 Jesus is at once the God who dwells in the Holy 
of Holies, the Priest who enters on behalf of the people, the sacrifice that signifies cove-
nant relationship and reconciliation, and the people themselves, in need of and desiring 
reconciliation. 106 
In his brief, but profoundly significant work, The Mediation of Christ, 107 
T. F. Torrance makes a similar point. "They [the Apostolic Fathers] found themselves 
coming to grips with the essential message of the Gospel embodied in Jesus in its relation 
104 N.T. Wright, The Challenge of Jesus (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 
1999), 35. 
105 Shelton, 137. 
106 Colin Gunton argues similarly in The Actuality of Atonement. 
107 I vividly remember the plane flight from Orlando to Chicago in 1999 during 
which I read this book. I remember thinking, "Nothing will ever be the same now." 
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to the age-old message of God that had been worked out in his covenant partnership with 
Israe1."108 
How do the Apostolic Fathers reach this understanding? "What are the tools we 
need in order to grasp the content of divine revelation?"109 In a way reminiscent of Leslie 
Newbegin's appropriation of the scientific philosophy of Michael Polanyi, Torrance 
draws an example from the field of physics. He recounts a conversation he had with the 
maker of highly sensitive, complex instruments for use in a high-energy physics lab. In 
order to make the highly specific instruments called for, the maker had to understand not 
just his field but had to also study and develop personal expertise in the field of high-
energy physics. This was to facilitate "the construction of appropriate tools with which to 
shape knowledge and understanding of what is being investigated."110 This leads him to 
consider the need for "conceptual tools" whose function: 
is particularly pressing when we have to do with something radically new which 
we cannot understand by assimilating it into the framework of what we already 
know, and for which old patterns of thought and speech are not only inadequate 
but can prove quite false. 111 
For Torrance, Israel serves this exact purpose. 
Let us consider God's relation to Israel in just this light. In his desire to reveal 
himself and make himself knowable to mankind, he selected one small race out of 
the whole mass of humanity, and subjected it to intensive interaction and dialogue 
108 
·r.F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ (Colorado Springs, CO: Helmers and 
Howard, 1992), 5. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid., 6. 
Ill Ibid. 
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with himself in such a way that he might mould and shape this people in the serv-
ice of his self-revelation. 112 
God's continued interaction with Israel gives them and us a conceptual framework, a 
paradigm to comprehend Jesus. To use Newbigin's illustration, Israel becomes the 
glasses lens through which we can properly "see" Jesus. 113 
For Torrance, this self-revelation is characterized by God's intense desire for rec-
onciliation. The point of Israel's election was never that they were an intrinsically holy or 
worthy people, "but precisely the reverse."114 God's covenant with Israel was "pure grace 
between God and Israel in its rebellious and estranged existence. Hence, no matter how 
rebellious or sinful Israel was, it could not escape the covenant love and faithfulness of 
God."115 He points to the book of Hosea to stress that even in the face of profound rejec-
tion and infidelity, "the bonds of God's steadfast love [hesedj retain their hold on Israel 
and lock into a relationship with God which will finally triumph over all estrangement 
and bring about reconciliation and peace."116 
This is not a love that glosses over sin and rebellion. In fact, the covenant God 
forms with Israel has the effect of: 
intensifying the conflict of Israel with God ... The more fully God gave himself to 
his people, the more he forced it to be what it actually was, what we all are, in the 
112 Ibid., 7. 
113 Leslie Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralistic Society (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1989), 35. 
114 Torrance, 27. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
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self-willed isolation of fallen humanity from God. Thus the movement of God's 
reconciling love toward Israel not only revealed Israel's sin but intensified it. 117 
Why would this be? For Torrance, the more Israel rebels, the deeper is God's self-
identification with Israel in their resulting suffering. This self-identification with Israel is 
key to the development of the conceptual tools needed to receive Christ. The Incarnation 
is not a new thought to the mind of God. As Bernhard Anderson says, God is the "taber-
nacling presence," 118 God dwelling with Israel in their wanderings. In Hosea 11:9, while 
stating that he will not come in wrath but in mercy, God affirms, "I am the Holy One 
among you," God in your midst. 
All of this leads Torrance student and Fuller Seminary professor Ray Anderson to 
assert that one of the key elements of the Old Testament's inner logic is that "grace pre-
supposes barrenness." Echoing Torrance, he sees the narrative flow of the life oflsrael as 
told in the Old Testament to be a "building into the reflexive muscle memory" of Israel, 
and by extension humanity, an awareness that we are barren and that God responds to our 
barrenness by extending grace and mercy. In this way, Israel's muscle memory or concep-
tual framework is prepared to receive the culmination of grace, Jesus Christ. 119 
Space does not allow full exploration of the Old Testament once one turns to the 
text looking for examples of "grace presupposes barrenness." Examples are too numerous 
to discuss all of them. Two pivotal scenes in the self-understanding of Israel will have to 
suffice. 
117 Ibid., 28. 
118 Anderson, 1 06. 
119 Ray Anderson, "Reconciliation and the Healing of Persons" Lectures, (Pasa-
dena, CA: Fuller Theological Seminary, Spring, 1999). 
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In Genesis 15, Abram and YHWH participate in a covenant-forming ceremony; 
they "cut a covenant." While all the elements seem consistent with similar ancient cus-
toms, there is one striking difference. Whereas typically it is the dominant party that die-
tated the terms of the covenant and attached attending punishments if the covenant were 
broken, 120 this does not happen here. Rather than God's requiring Abram to pass between 
the slaughtered animals, stating, in McKenzie's words, "As it has been done to these 
animals so it will be done to you if you break this covenant." 121 It is the burning pot, 
symbolizing God, that passes through. Bernhard Anderson says: 
Notice, however, that in this eerie covenant making rite, during 
which God made a pledge under solemn oath, the patriarch was in 
a passive state, asleep. The covenant was made unilaterally by 
God; Abram was a passive recipient. ... This covenant is character-
ized by the giving of fromises (by God to Abram), not the imposi-
tion of obligations."12 
430 years later, God gets around to giving his covenant partners the Law. Now, at 
last is the Old Testament God we so fully expect, stem, legalistic, and wrathful. Right? 
No. Taking just one ofthe Deuteronomic commandments, the injunction to keep the Sab-
bath, makes the point. Why is it that God commands that Israel abstain from work one 
day a week? "Remember that you were slaves in Egypt and that the Lord your God 
brought you out of there with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm."123 According to 
120 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (Louisville, KY: Abingdon, 1996), 
154-5. 
121 Steven L McKenzie, Covenant (St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press, 2000) 17. 
1 22 Bernhard Anderson, 99. 
123 Deuteronomy 5:15 
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Bernhard Anderson, "behind the commandment, then, is the demonstration of the prior 
love and grace of God. 124 Essentially the Torah is not a matter of, "Here are my rules. If 
you keep them, I will love you," but, rather, "I have put you in relationship with me, be-
cause I love you. Here is what that relationship looks like." 
Sacrifice, a sign of God's love or God's wrath? 
That sacrifice in the Old Testament is associated with punishment and the as-
suaging of God's anger is often assumed and needs no rehearsal. But is that valid? The 
shedding of blood is assumed to lend sacrifice a retributive quality. It is helpful again to 
reference Gun ton's observation of the provision of a cup of grain as a substitute for the 
poor. "The (provision) is important for demonstrating, as Whale points out, that sacrifice 
does not here carry any connotations of vengeance or punishment: 'You cannot punish a 
cup of barley. "'125 Echoing the contextualization of the law within the gracious act of the 
Exodus, Gunton goes on to say, "Ultimately, all sacrifices in the Old Testament depend 
for their context upon the story of God's deliverance of his people from Egypt at the 
Exodus. If there is a centre, it is to be found at the place where Israel began to understand 
the roots of her life in its relation to God."126 
Anderson frames the issue in the difference between propitiation and expiation 
and the debate over which concept dominates OT sacrifices. In propitiation, God is angry 
and alienated from humanity and "requires something to appease divine anger before 
showing favor to the sinner. The hindrance to reconciliation lies with God [emphasis 
124 Bernhard Anderson, 146. 
125 Gunton, 120. 
126 Ibid., 121. 
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mine]. By contrast, in the case of expiation the hindrance to right relationship lies in hu-
man sin and the obstacle is overcome by the God-provided means of grace."127 
For Anderson, sacrifice in the Old Testament comes down clearly on the side of 
expiation over propitiation. Shelton sees both terms having validity. "Ultimately, atone-
mentis achieved, both in the Old and New Testaments, by expiation that leads to propi-
tiation."128 Still, his emphasis clearly is upon expiation as the dominating theme. "God is 
no longer wrathful because his intention was to maintain the covenant fellowship in the 
first place."129 And again, "Indeed, God initiated the procedure for atonement and recon-
ciliation. The action of God is always to restore the covenant." 130 
Much of evangelical theology has maintained that the Deuteronomic sacrificial 
system called for, "life for life, or blood for blood. No forgiveness without blood meant 
no atonement without substitution,"131 in Stott's words. And that the God "who is angry 
and alienated by human sin, requires something to appease divine anger before showing 
favor to the sinner."132 Shelton strenuously argues against these positions. While I am 
unable to give the full range of argument here, his emphasis upon our reading of "the lay-
ing on hands" in the sacrificial cultus is of utmost importance. Shelton argues that the 
127 d 2 An erson., 1 0. 
128 Shelton, 69. 
129 Ibid., 69. 
130 Ibid., 70. 
131 Stott, 138. 
132 Anderson, 120. 
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"blood for blood' or economy of "a life demanded for sin" has its theological roots 133 in 
an inattentive reading of the sacrificial ceremonies themselves. 
While offerings in the pagan cultures surrounding Israel often did serve to "propi-
tiate, appease or bribe to counteract a god's vengeance"134 this was not so in the life of 
Israel. Here, sacrifices "function as gifts to God, a means of expiation, and a means of 
communion with God."135 It can also be argued, I would maintain, that these rituals in 
that they were provided by the stronger of the covenant partners were a gift from God to 
Israel rather than a burden as we in Christianity have tended to view them. Even if God 
did demand equal payment for sin, substitution, life for life, is there any real way in 
which a goat could be viewed as an equal and adequate stand-in for the nation? 
Similarly misplaced is our belief that the sacrificial goat had the sins of the people 
placed upon it, in that way foreshadowing the sins of all humanity's being placed upon 
Christ. Shelton argues that failure to understand the difference in laying on one hand and 
laying on two hands has caused this misconception. In the ceremony surrounding the Day 
of Atonement there were two goats, each of which experienced a laying on of hands. 
Transference, the passing of one's essence or being to another, occurs in the laying on of 
both hands. This is not what happens to the slain goat; it happens to the scapegoat or the 
goat that is driven into the wilderness, away from the people. 136 The goat that is slaugh-
tered and whose blood is splattered around the Holy of Holies receives one hand upon it. 
133 It has cultural roots as well in the European understanding of judicial justice 
and punishment, particularly from Anselm forward. 
134 Shelton, 63. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid., 54. The referent scripture is Leviticus 16. 
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This symbolizes identification with more than transferal to. In language almost identical 
to Torrance, Shelton states that, "the ceremony of sprinkling the blood on the altar and on 
the people consecrates them both and renews the covenant binding-together of God and 
Israel [emphasis mine]."137 
Finally, and on a related point, Shelton stresses the importance of ritual cleansing 
and purity in regard to the priest and the Holy of Holies. In light of this, he argues that it 
seems inconceivable that blood that is not only not purified, but has been ultra-defiled by 
bearing all of the people's sins, would be splattered upon the most Holy physical space in 
the world. With this in mind, viewing the blood as a cleansing agent is more appropriate. 
The blood represents our being cleansed by God. 
Paul Fiddes roots the concept of justification, which has traditionally been rooted 
in the appeasement, propitiation view of sacrifice, in covenantal tones; "this Hebrew set-
ting means that 'justification' while a legal term is at root a matter of relationships. He-
brew law was concerned with the health of the covenant community."138 While this may 
be a minority view within many evangelical circles, it warrants more attention, particu-
larly in light of the previously argued covenant/relational narrative arc of the Old Testa-
ment. 
137 Ibid., 56. 
138 PaulS. Fiddes, Past Event and Present Salvation (Louisville, KY: Westmin-
ster John Knox, 1989), 87. 
47 
Narrative Precedes Theology. 
Stanley Grenz and John Franke said, "The reading of the biblical text must al-
ways take precedence over our theological constructions."139 Here they directly follow 
the thinking of Stanley Hauerwas when he asserts, "they [doctrines] are not the meaning 
at the heart of the stories. Rather they are tools ... meant to help us tell the story better." 140 
He contrasts this with the "standard picture" that " ... assumes that if scripture is to be 
meaningful it must be translated into a more general theological medium."141 
Hauerwas and William Willimon are standing on the shoulders of Alasdair Mac-
Intyre, as many do, when they say: 
How does God deal with human fear, confusion, and paralysis? God tells a story: 
I am none other than the God who 'brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of 
the house of bondage.' Knowing that story makes sense out of the following 
command that Israel 'shall have no other gods before me .. .Idolatry is condemned 
only on the basis of a story we know about God. 142 
In his profoundly influential book, After Virtue, Macintyre stresses that to be human is to 
be 'embedded' in a story. "I can only answer the question, 'What am I to do?' if I can 
139 Stanley J. Grenz, and John R. Franke, Beyond Foundationalism (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 83. 
140 Stanley Haurwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics 
(Notre Dame, IN: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1983), 26. 
141 Ibid., 55. 
142 Stanley Haurwas and William H. Willimon, Resident Aliens (Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 1989), 54. 
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answer the prior question, 'Of what story do I find myself a part?"'143 Newbigin helpfully 
adds, "What is the whole story of which my story is a part?"144 
Arriving at the same place from a different tack is Catherine Mowry LaCugna, 
who states, "Theological statements are possible not because we have some independent 
insight into God ... but because God has revealed and communicated God's self, God's 
personal existence, God's infinite mystery."145 And how has God revealed and communi-
cated God's self? LaCugna, building upon Barth and Rahner, would argue that revelation 
is in action in history rather than in proposition. There is no difference between God-in-
Revelation (God in history) and God-in-Etemity (God in theological construct). 146 Jesus 
is the story of God. 147 
All this is to say that our understanding of the atonement needs to begin in the 
biblical narrative before working its way to the theology of Paul or the theology of the 
Church Fathers. Both Paul and the creeds are of immense worth but, as Hauerwas points 
out, as tools to tell the story better, not as the starting point themselves. Stories are not 
just for children, to be later sloughed aside in favor of theological formulations. If Jesus 
is the revelation of God, then God is revealed in Jesus' actions, in his story. Likewise, the 
143 Alisdair Macintyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1981) 
219. 
144 Newbigin, 99. 
145 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God For Us (San Francisco, CA: Harper Collins, 
1991), 3. 
146 Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self 35-37. 
147 Hauerwas, Community of Character. 50. 
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revelation of God in the Old Testament is in God's interactions with a people, the family 
of Abraham and later the people of Israel. 
Not only a storied-God, but a story-telling God. If Barth, Macintyre, Newbigin, 
Hauerwas, and others are correct that approaching scripture as first story and later theol-
ogy is correct and God is primarily revealed to human understanding through God's ac-
tions in history, then it follows that particular attention should be given to the stories God 
tells. Obviously, all of scripture, from this perspective is a story God is telling, but I have 
in mind the specific stories of God. I would argue that two of these, the story of Hosea 
and his relationship with his wife Gomer and Jesus' parable of the Prodigal Son are sto-
ries God tells that have profound atonement implications. 
Hosea 
As is often the case with the Old Testament prophets, their actions have prophetic 
weight along with their words. 148 Certainly this is the case with Hosea and, further, God 
explicitly spells out those implications. "Go, marry a promiscuous woman and have chil-
dren with her, for like an adulterous wife, this land is guilty of unfaithfulness to the 
Lord."149 And again, "Go, show your love to your wife again, though she is loved by an-
other and is an adulterous. Love her as the Lord loves the Israelites, though they tum to 
other gods ... "150 In the actions of Hosea toward Gomer, we are seeing a living parallel to 
God's interactions, first with Israel, and in a larger sense with all of humanity through 
Christ. Torrance says: 
148 See Jeremiah or Jonah as further examples. 
149 Hosea 1 :2. 
150 Hosea 3:1. 
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The covenant between God and Israel was not a covenant between God and a holy 
people, but precisely the reverse .... Not matter how rebellious or sinful Israel 
was, it could not escape from the covenant love and faithfulness of God. That is 
the aspect of the covenant that is brought out so poignantly in the book of Hosea. 
Even if Israel persists in adulterating its relationship with God, he will not divorce 
Israel, for the bonds of God's steadfast love retain their hold upon Israel and lock 
into a relationship with God which will finally triumph over all estrangement and 
bring about reconciliation and peace. 151 
He is directly tying the story of Hosea/ Gomer to Israel's covenant relationship with God 
and, in saying that God's steadfast love "will finally triumph over all estrangement and 
bring about reconciliation and peace," he is clearly pushing forward to Christ. Hosea 
"tastes in his own being Yahweh's bittemess over the people's apostasy," 152 according to 
Pentiuc. This is not just Israel's apostasy, for, "we are not overhearing a conversation be-
tween God and ancient Israel, but finding ourselves involved directly,"153 states Kidner. 
To demonstrate how Hosea's story provides metaphoric resonance with atone-
ment theology, I will now highlight key points in the story and how they address issues 
and concems of atonement theologians: 
Is movement God-initiated as opposed to humanity-initiated? 
Clearly. Hosea, standing in the role of God, marries Gomer. Once the infidelity 
on Gomer's part has begun he sends their children to plead with her, 154 he woos her by 
151 Torrance, 27. 
152 Eugen J. Pentiuc, Long-Sziffering Love: A Commentary on Hosea (Brookline, 
MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2002), 25. 
153 Derek Kidner, The Message of Hosea (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1981), 39. 
154 Hosea 2:2. 
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speaking tenderly in the wilderness to her [a picnic with love poems?], 155 he gives her 
gifts, 156 and finally he buys her back from slavery, not to be his slave but again to be his 
wife. 157 She makes no move of reconciliation at all. All action is on Hosea's part. 
Does it take sin seriously? 
In describing the book of Hosea's treatment of Israel's sin, Derek Kidner states, 
"This approach [setting sin in a marital framework] is far from sentimental. It sharpens 
guilt immeasurably [my emphasis] by making it the betrayal of love."158 Similarly, Ray 
Anderson argues, "unless we are involved in a history of trust and commitment, we feel 
no strong sense of betrayal when such a breach occurs ... betrayal rends the fabric of an 
intimate relationship, there is no safe distance from it. 159 While steadfast love, hesed, is 
the abundant theme of the story, judgment, pain, and even wrath at the sin of unfaithful-
ness are clearly present. They just do not dominate or prevail. Love does. 
Does it demonstrate some sense of sin bearing, shame bearing, or cost paying 
by the innocent party on behalf of the guilty? 
This is likely the point where penal substitutionary proponents say, "Nice story, 
but there's no substitution here." In a forensic sense, that is true, but I would argue that 
courtrooms are not the only place where one might take on the guilt or shame of another 
155 v. 14. 
156 v. 15. 
157 Hosea 2:1-3 and 2:16. 
158 Kidner 45 
' . 
159 RayS. Anderson, The Gospel According to Judas (Colorado Springs, CO: 
Navpress, 1991), 15. 
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to bear it away. Colin Gunton was cited earlier arguing that covenant should be under-
stood more relationally than legally and I believe the same principle applies here. Ray 
Anderson is most helpful here. He defines sin as "a transgression of a relationship with 
God and with others,"160 and then goes on to discuss what is needed for relational recon-
ciliation to occur: "The sin of betrayal is already contextualized by the greater fact of the 
relationship."161 For one party to betray, the other party must be faithful. "The positive 
evidence of the relation continues to exist as an actuality bound up in the personhood of 
the one betrayed."162 The only possibility for reconciliation, then, is in the hands of the 
betrayed. "The possibility of healing broken relationships always issues from the power 
of love to embrace the wrong done to it [my emphasis] for the sake of restoring fellow-
ship and love." 163 Embracing the wrong is a deeply painful and yet essential process for 
real reconciliation to occur. Miroslav Volf's recent work, The End of Mem01y, deals pre-
cisely with the pain and potential great good of the wounded to truly remember and own 
the pain done to them in order to truly forgive and forget. 164 
The names of Hosea's children are a reminder of his experience of betrayal and a 
daily source of shame. He purchases her back, at great cost both to his wealth and to his 
160 Ibid., 76. 
161 Ibid., 77. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid., 78. 
164 Miroslav Volf, The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006). The framing narrative of the book is Volf's per-
sonal struggle to forgive a Serbian military officer who engineered Volf's surveillance 
and repeated interrogation and accusation in 1984. 
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public standing. His paying of the reclamation price in a mixture of coins and grain indi-
cates that he has had to "scrape together"165 the needed amount. In publicly buying her 
back, "old wounds would have to be reopened and [the possibility faced] that what had 
happened once might happen yet again."166 It is possible for Hosea to avoid taking on the 
pain caused by Gomer's sin. It is possible for him to not bear the shame of all that has 
happened. He could either disavow her, write the relationship off forever, or he could 
punish her, buy her back to make her pay. He does neither; he buys her in order to love 
her. Of course, he does, because he is loving as God loves. 
Does it effect actual reconciliation as opposed to merely brushing over differ-
ence? 
Anyone who has had a spouse say, "We are just going to pretend like you didn't 
just say that," knows that, in fact, the opposite is about to transpire. Brushing over an of-
fence in no way brings reconciliation. It just avoids dealing with the rupture to relation-
ship. This is not the path Hosea takes. Rather, he faces "the poignant personal demands 
that are involved in mending any close relationship. This was no arm's length settling of 
a legal battle or extracting of apologies. A marriage asks, because it offers, nothing facile 
or transitory. "167 
justice. 
Real forgiveness, in fact, requires naming the wrong. It does not h1rn its back on 
165 Kidner, 42. and Pentiuc, 85. 
166 Kidner, 40. 
167 Ibid. 
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Forgiveness is no mere discharge of a victim's angry resentment or mere assuag-
ing of a perpetrator's remorseful anguish .... On the contrary, every act of forgive-
ness enthrones justice, it draws attention to its violation precisely by offering to 
forego its claims .... Much more than the absence of hostility ... peace is commun-
ion between former enemies ... [when] the victim refuses to be defined by the per-
petrator, forgives and makes space in himself for the enemy. 168 
Forgiveness is not the weak substitute for justice. Forgiveness achieves what ret-
ribution cannot. It does so not by the victim being either so afraid or so lacking in self-
esteem to name the wrong done to them. Rather, forgiveness is the victim of wrong 
knowing what could be demanded (revenge or rejection) and offering instead reconcilia-
tion. 
Is there a need for a response? 
A response is needed, though the order of events is of paramount importance. No 
amount of recalcitrance can trigger forgiveness. It must be offered by the one wronged. 
But it must also be received. Anns can be extended in the offer of embrace (to use Volfs 
beautiful image), but the other may tum away, recoil, or stiffen in rejection. For embrace 
to happen, the recipient, in this case, the perpetrator, must open as well to receive em-
brace. 
The Prodigal Son 
William Barclay echoes the observation of R.C. Trench that for centuries the par-
able of the prodigal son has been called "the Gospel within the Gospels" and "the very 
essence of the faith." 169 David Wenham states, "There is no more powerful a picture of 
the forgiving love of God or of the motivation behind Jesus' ministry within the Bi-
168 Volf, Exclusion and Embrace. 123-126. 
169 William Barclay, The Parables of Jesus (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox, 1970), 182. 
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ble."170 In describing the gospel Schmiechen states, "though humanity is justifiably 
guilty, God unilaterally reveals a love that draws humanity back to God. The parable of 
the prodigal son stands as the great witness to such love." 171 John Stott sees the parable 
"implicitly expressing" the doctrine that Jesus "showed his love in bearing our penalty 
and therefore our pain, in order to be able to forgive and restore us."172 N. T. Wright sees 
Jesus using the parable as paradigmatic of his role in bringing about the final return of 
Israel from Exile. 173 
And yet, I have been flatly told by staunch defenders of penal substitution, "It's a 
beautiful story of God's love, but there is no atonement there."174 Opponents of penal 
substitution at times make the same claim. John Stott, in The Cross of Christ, cites Hast-
ings Rashdall and Douglas White as arguing that the prodigal son preaches a gospel of 
"forgiveness without atonement."175 Kenneth Bailey points out that Muslims see the par-
able as Jesus' own refutation of the Christian doctrine of the atonement. According to 
Bailey, Muslims see no incarnation or atonement in the parable, only repentance and 
170 David Wenham, The Parables of Jesus (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1989), 105. 
171 Schmiechen, 291. 
172 Stott, 224. 
173 N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
1996), 127. 
174 In conversation with Young Life national leadership in the fall of 2007 regard-
ing the nature of YL' s presentation of the Gospel. 
175 Stott, 222. 
56 
mercy. "Jesus in this parable is a good Muslim who affirms Muslim theology." 176 How 
can Stott and those who find atonement theology deeply embedded in the parable make 
this claim? Is the parable of the prodigal son the heart of the Gospel or the refutation of 
the Gospel that Muslims are said by Bailey to make it out to be? 
Kenneth Bailey's groundbreaking177 treatment of the parable in the light of over 
40 years of ministry in the Middle East beautifully resolves these questions. The key, he 
argues, is reading this familial story with eyes open to the family dynamics of Middle 
Eastern patriarchal, honor/shame based cultures. While a number of these observations 
are backed by commentators such as Jeremias, 178who sees the parable as Jesus' "apolo-
getic,"179 I have not encountered anyone who pulls them together so cohesively and con-
vincingly and I will therefore draw from him at some length. 
Disowning, "Two sons have I not." The son, in asking for his share of the inheri-
tance is not just asking for money, he is insulting his father. "Such a request in a village 
society means only one thing. The younger son is impatient for his father's death ... the 
son chose deliberately to wound his father's heart and break all his relationships with the 
family." 180 Bailey's comment that this is transpiring in a "village society" is crucial. The 
176 According to Bailey, Muslims see no incarnation or atonement in the parable 
only repentance and mercy. "Jesus in this parable is a good Muslim who affirms Muslim 
theology." The Cross and the Prodigal, 2nd Ed, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 
2005), 15. 
177 It is referenced repeatedly by more recent commentaries on Luke 15. 
178 Jachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1954), 128-132. 
179 Ibid., 132. 
180 Bailey, 40, 44. 
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wound has not just transpired in the home; it has ramifications in the village. The result 
of this public insult and humiliation would typically be to "disown the son."181 Bailey 
entitles the first act of a short play he has written about the parable, "Two sons have I 
not" in a reflection of the expected cultural response to the son's act. The son should be 
"dead to him." 
I am no longer worthy to be called your son. The son's claim to sonship has been 
forfeited. He is not asking, as he heads for home, to return into the home. He just hopes 
for a more favorable employment situation. He understands that there is nothing he can 
do to reconstitute his relationship to his father. "Father, I have no claim on you whatso-
ever. " 182 
Kezazah. Bailey describes the communal nature of rejection that would have 
awaited the son: 
Village society is vicious to the man who is down. Wandering beggars endure un-
speakable taunting ... verbal cruelty ... and derisive choruses. The prodigal will 
have to face this band [of youths]. He will be verbally attacked by it, only in his 
case the adults will join the mockery rather than protect him from it. 183 
It is possible for the father to maintain his honor in all of this. In fact, the Kezazah is 
largely a communal preservation of his honor. He will not be the one verbally attacked. 
He is removed. 
181 Ibid., 47. 
182 Helmut Thielecke, The Waiting Father (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 
1959), 27. 
183 Bailey, 55. 
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After Kezazah. Following the communal ceremony, the son would "then be obli-
gated to sit for some time outside the family gate of the family home before being al-
lowed to even see his father. Finally he would be summoned." 184 And not summoned for 
a reunion: he would be summoned to grovel, to beg for mercy. It now goes without say-
ing; nowhere in sight is relational reconciliation. Everything in play here is about preserv-
ing honor for the father and heaping shame upon the son. 
A father who violates all the rules. "No one in the village thinks or acts as a sepa-
rate person but as a part of the tightly knit village society. The individual's solidarity with 
that community is unshakable," 185 Bailey notes. One is reminded of Tevye's response to 
his daughter Chava in "Fiddler on the Roof." Though he loves her desperately, he cannot 
bring himself to even acknowledge her existence after she marries a Gentile. Communal 
tradition, solidarity, and honor are stronger than love. But this father "breaks all the 
rules."186 He does not sit aloof in his house; he runs through town to his son. "In the 
Middle East a man his age and position always walks in a slow, dignified fashion. It is 
safe to assume that he has not run anywhere for any purpose for forty years. No villager 
over the age of twenty-five ever runs. 187 
And where is he running? Through the town, in front of the mob who awaits the 
son's return to heap scorn and derision upon him. Certainly, his running serves two func-
184 Ibid., 66. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid., 67. 
187 Ibid. 
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tions. First, he shields his son from the mocking of the mob. Second, he runs the risk of it 
now being turned upon him. 
Outpouring emotion. Miroslav Volf states, "It was the profound and singularly 
fecund story of the prodigal son that originally triggered the idea for a 'theology of em-
brace. "'188 It is clearly not possible to quote the entirety of Volf's book here, but his con-
ception of the power of embrace, literally and metaphorically, is profound. It is a move 
that is both a reach out and an opening to. Boldness and vulnerability. The father, in his 
honor, dignity, and purity embraces the dishonored, shamed, dung covered son. 
Giving gifts, reconstituting personhood. The father's robe, a ring, shoes, the fat-
ted calf and a feast-all bestowed upon the son by the father. Bailey maintains "the father 
very carefully reestablishes the boy's broken relationships with each group (in the family 
and the village) in turn."189 Miroslav Volf believes, "With a command to the slaves, the 
father reconstructed [my emphasis] the prodigal's identity."190 The father, in Volf's read-
ing, allows himself to be "un-fathered" (viewed as dead by his son) so that in suffering 
this "death" he can keep the son in his heart, eventually restoring him to life and right re-
lationship. 191 "[The father] throws a party that has been called a 're-investiture,' treating 
188 Volf., 156. 
189 Bailey, 71. 
190 Volf, 160. 
191 Ibid. 165. 
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him as one would treat an honored guest, killing the fatted calf, celebrating in grand 
style."192 
Incarnation and atonement in this parable? As noted previously, Bailey's pro-
ject was initially motivated by the fact that Muslims use the parable to undercut the 
Christian doctrines of incarnation and atonement. Is that warranted? I quote here him here 
at length as he makes his point. 
The father in his house clearly represents God. The best understanding of the text 
is to see that when the father leaves the house and takes upon himself a humiliat-
ing posture on the road, he becomes a symbol of God incarnate. He does not wait 
for the prodigal to come to him but rather at great cost to himself goes down and 
out to find and resurrect the one who is lost and dead .... This parable depicts a fa-
ther who leaves the comfort and security of his home and humiliates himself be-
fore the village. The coming down and going out to the son is a parable of the in-
carnation. The costly demonstration of unexpected love in the village street dem-
onstrates a part of the meaning of the cross. 193 [my emphasis] 
Summary of the parables. In both the living parable of Hosea's marriage to 
Gomer and in Jesus' telling of the parable of the prodigal son (better named the parable 
of the loving father194) we have God narrating stories meant to describe his telos or pro-
ject in the world. In both cases, we have actions taken by the innocent to restore relation-
ship with the guilty. Actions are taken at great cost-financially, in terms of setting aside 
justifiable wrath or resentments, and in the incurring of great shame to bring about rela-
tional restoration and reconciliation. There is a clear substitutionary element to both sto-
ries, if not in a forensic sense, certainly in a relational one. In doing so, I follow Bailey's 
192 Craig L. Blomberg, Preaching the Parables (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Aca-
demic, 2004), 39. 
193 Bailey, 67. 
194 Theilecke, 27. 
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orienting of the parable of the prodigal son in a cultural context whose locus is shame 
avoidance and honor preservation, as opposed to legal standing. Coming from his mission 
experience in Japan, also a honor/shame centered culture, C. Norman Kraus similarly re-
jects a primarily legal orientation to the atonement. 195 This rejection also follows those 
who see covenantal relationship as the unifying theme of scripture. Given the framework 
laid out regarding God's covenantal thrust throughout scripture, these two parables seem 
to contain the DNA of God's atoning work. 
I now tum to two last points that further highlight God's relational orientation in 
the atonement. Both points deal with the nature of personhood, God's and ours. 
Persons in relation: God and humans. 
Why have I so adamantly pushed for a relational conception of God's work 
throughout all of scripture and specifically in the atonement? The answer lies in a convic-
tion that God is primarily understood as "God-in-relation" and that we as humans, as 
bearers of the imago dei, are relationally constructed selves. 
The Nought. 201h Century Catholic novelist Walker Percy, in his novels and in his 
essays, writes of a noughted self in the postmodern west. A noughted self is always de-
vouring and never full, always seeking substance and ever insubstantial. "If I can have 
that car, my life will be different, for my nothingness will be informed by the having of it. 
195 I have included a most helpful graph comparing the atonement from a shame 
vs. guilt orientation from Kraus' book, Jesus Christ Our Lord, appendix A. (Scottsdale, 
P A: Herald Press, 1987), 256. 
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But, once it enters the zone of my nought, the car is emptied out and, instead of informing 
me, only participates in my nothingness."196 
This is a self, in this age of seemingly limitless resources and opportunities for 
self-gratification and self-actualization, that discovers, "how very odd it is, when one 
stops to think of it, that the very moment he arrives at the threshold of his new city, with 
all its hard won relief from the sufferings of the past, happens to be the same moment he 
runs out ofmeaning!"197 
In the poet T. S. Eliot's terms, this is the "hollow man." To build upon Percy's 
statements, how is it that in an age where, at least in the industrialized West, there is vir-
tually no limit to the ability to gratify every perceived need and vast amounts of personal 
and cultural energy is devoted to actualization of the self, we as individuals and a society 
feel ourselves to be so insubstantial, so "lost in the cosmos?" 198 Why do we feel, along 
with Percy's postmodern "he," the following to be true? 
He can never forget who he is: that he is a stranger, a castaway, who despite a 
lifetime of striving to be at home on the island is as homeless now as the first day 
he found himself cast up on the beach .... I mean that in his heart of hearts there is 
not a moment of his life when the castaway does not know that life on the island, 
being 'at home' on the island, is a charade. 199 
196 Walker Percy, The Message in the Bottle (New York, NY: Farrar and Straus, 
1975), 287. 
197 Ibid., 112. 
198 Walker Percy, Lost in the Cosmos (New York, NY: Farrar and Strauss, 1989). 
199 Percy, The Message in The Bottle, 189. 
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This is the self that Martin Buber called the "severed 1"200 and is a member, as 
Christian apologist Francis Schaeffer passionately argued in the 1970s, of a "cut flower 
generation." In Schaeffer's analogy, a generation that still bears some outward semblance 
of life, of substantiality, but is cut off from any life-giving source and is already dead. As 
Philip Cushman says in describing the self in 201h century America, "the self became 
fragmented, diffuse and somehow 'unreal. "'201 Middleton and Walsh put it this way, 
"The modem era began with Columbus setting out to sea. He seemed to have at least 
some idea of where he was going. As that epoch ends and a postmodem era begins, we 
again find ourselves at sea. But this time we have no navigational assistance and no direc-
tion. We are alone and adrift."202 How did we get here? 
The myth of autonomy. Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen calls Aristotle the "virtual 
parent of modem psychology" in that "many of the basic assumptions of these fields trace 
their heritage back to Aristotle, whose thinking (revived in the sixteenth century) had so 
much to do with the emergence of modem science generally."203 Aristotle posited the 
"teleological principle" of personhood: that humans progress in development toward an 
end, a goal, or a telos. Van Leeuwen argues that for Aristotle, this telos is achieved 
200 Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York, NY: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1971), 
115. 
201 Cushman, 66. 
202 Richard J. Middleton, and Brian J. Walsh, Truth is Stranger Than It Used to 
Be. (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1995), 62. 
203 Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen, "Aristotle, The Biblical Drama and the Meaning 
of Personhood" in On Being a Person, Todd H. Speidell ed. (Eugene, OR, Wipf and 
Stock Pubilishers, 2002), 15. 
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through the application of reason to the pursuit of the "Pure Form,"204 the Ideal. While I 
will later argue that a biblical conception of telos as participation in the relationality of 
the Trinity and participation in God's relationally restorative work in creation, the em-
phasis at this point is upon the role of reason as a tool to attain to pure form. The seat of 
personhood is being anchored within the self and within contemplation of an abstraction. 
"The self of the philosopher sought the Universal Good, not the particular, local commu-
nal rules laid down by the local gods. "205 I am a self in my interior relation to a Principle, 
not in my particular, inter-dependent relationships. 
In the Enlightenment, this detached autonomy reawakens from its medieval slum-
ber. Philip Cushman states: 
The removal of God out (emphasis his) of the world, the development of an ob-
jective stance toward the world and toward oneself, the universalization of doubt, 
the extension and elaboration of the concept of interiority, and the valorization of 
rationality were all begun or advanced by Descartes .... (He) found order and truth 
through the interiorized searching of the individualized, logical thinker. 206 
Similarly, John Locke posits a self defined by its "power to disengage from and remake 
itself. It was a self that was pure, independent, disengaged, instrumental conscious-
ness."
207 This is the self of the American Declaration of Independence and the Constitu-
tion. This is the self of "individual liberties and rights," of "self-evident" truths. 
204 Ibid., 16. 
205 Cushman, 360. 
206 Ibid., 374. 
207 Ibid., 378. 
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The Cartesian self, existing because of cogito208 is a bounded self. Self emanates 
from within and evaluates, consumes, rejects, or uses the world that it encounters. In I 
and Thou, Martin Buber calls this a self that interacts with the world only in terms ofl-It. 
I perceive something. I feel something. I imagine something. I want something. I 
sense something. I think something. The life of a human being does not consist 
merely of all this and its like. All this and its like is the basis of the realm It. But 
the realm ofYou has another basis 209 .... The basic word l-It is made possible only 
by this recognition, by the detachment of the I.210 
Now, however, the detached I is transformed-reduced from substantial fullness 
to the functional one-dimensionality of a subject that experiences and uses ob-
jects.211 
I will later spend a considerable amount oftime looking at Buber's idea ofl-You, 
but his contrasting concept of l-It provides an invaluable tool for understanding the im-
plications of Descarte's detached, self-contained (bounded), individualism. To Buber, 
this conception of the self turns all else into an It an object, a thing which I consider from 
the fortress of autonomy. Obviously, this objectification extends to the selfs interactions 
with other humans and ultimately with God. 
Rather than empowering the self, making it master of the umverse m a 
Nietzschian sense, Buber argues that the supposedly autonomous self is an illusion. The 
"severed I" (severed from I-You relationality) is the I of ego. "The person beholds his 
self; the ego occupies himself with his MY: my manner, my race, my works, my genius. 
208 I think, therefore I am. 
209 Buber, 54. 
210 Ibid., 73. 
21 I Ibid., 80. 
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The ego does not participate in any actuality nor does he gain any."212 He refers to the I 
that defines itself in It relations as a "golem, an animated clod without a soul."213 
In significantly different language but along similar lines, Cushman states that in 
20th Century America familial and communal influences upon identity recede and: 
The individual self came to be seen as the ultimate locus of salvation; the self was 
ever evolving, constantly changing, on a never ending search for self-actualization 
and 'growth'. Even today personal fulfillment is seen as residing primarily within 
(emphasis his) the individual who is supposed to be self-sufficient and self-
satisfied. 214 
Instead of resulting in promised self-sufficiency or self-satisfaction, however, Cushman 
sees something radically different. 
In post-WWII America, the cultural landscape has configured the self. . .into a par-
ticular kind of masterful, bounded self, the empty self (emphasis mine]. By this I 
mean a self that experiences a significant absence of community, tradition, and 
shared meaning- a self that experiences these social absences and their conse-
quences 'interiorly' as a lack of personal conviction and worth; a self that embod-
ies the absences, loneliness, and disappointments of life as a chronic, undifferenti-
ated emotional hunger. It is this undifferentiated hunger that has provided the mo-
tivation for the mindless, wasteful consumerism of the late 20th Century.215 
In this description, we have retumed to the self as described by Walker Percy, 
purchasing a car with the hope that it will "inform my nothingness" only to rather have 
my nothingness swallow up the car and hunger for something new, something more. 
What is understood is that this consumerism extends to inter-personal relations. Assum-
ing I should be self-sufficient and self-satisfied and yet experiencing Cushman's "undif-
212 Ibid., 114. 
213 Ibid., 93. 
214 Cushman. 77. 
215 Ibid., 79. 
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ferentiated emotional hunger," I move through encounters with others seeking to satiate 
my hunger by taking from each what I think will fill me and being ever unsatisfied. We 
here again see Ray Anderson's conception of sin as fundamentally relationally centered. 
216 
The autonomous self considers God. Before moving to the description of what I 
believe is a biblical and robust view of personhood drawing upon the work of Buber, Karl 
Barth, and Miroslav Volf, I would like to briefly consider the implications of the autono-
mous thinking self as it turns its gaze toward God. If the autonomous thinking self is truly 
fully constituted interiorly and if, therefore, all encounters are It encounters, it follows 
that encounters with God will be the same. Perhaps God has something to offer to assist 
in the Lockian project of remaking oneself. Perhaps God can contribute to self-
actualization. Perhaps God can contribute to the alleviation of my "emotional hunger." If 
so, then God is usefitl to me. God serves a helpful function in my personal project. 
While few would use such straightforward language, it is not difficult to argue 
that this is the shape that much American Evangelical theology takes on a personal level. 
Christ's death on the cross deals with "my sin problem." God fills the "hole in my heart." 
Even, "I have begun my personal relationship with Jesus." Why did Jesus come? He 
came to make possible my salvation. I am drawn to faith because Jesus meets my emo-
tional needs. 
I am not arguing here that there is no level of truth in these statements. I am, at 
this point, just attempting to highlight the marked self and interiorly focused nature of 
these statements. The point here is to accentuate the way in which biblical concepts and 
216 Scot McKnight similarly discusses sin in terms of "hyperrelationality," in 
Community of Atonement. 
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realities can be shaped so as to be seen through an individualistic, other-objectifying lens 
without our even noticing. I will return to this point at the conclusion of the paper, but 
now tum to the positing of an alternative version of personhood. 
!-You. 
Martin Buber resoundingly rejected any reductionist, materialist orientation in 
terms of personhood. As discussed earlier, Buber starkly contrasts the l-It dyad with that 
of I-You. A fair bit has already been said about l-It. I now tum to Buber's alternative, I-
You. 
In significant ways, Buber strikes me as being akin to deconstructionists like Der-
rida and Levinas. Buber's extreme rejection of any approach to interactions that turns the 
other into an It, an object seems comparable to a Derridian rejection of language because 
it is oppressive and objectifying. Additionally, his insistency on the primacy of the un-
mediated encounter resonates, particularly with Levinas' idea of visibility. 217 
Buber's entire project is built around the ideas: "Relation is reciprocity"218 and 
"all actual life is encounter,"219 or phrased slightly differently, "in the beginning is the 
217 Where Buber would talk about the I being wholly present and open to the You, 
Levinas would use the language of being 'visible" to the other and truly "seeing" that 
other. Where Buber would describe objectifying as It, Levinas would use the language of 
invisibility; either the I being "invisible" by withholding or masking one's true self or by 
making the other "invisible" seeing them as a Jew, a Gay, a Black and therefore recusing 
oneself of obligation to encounter the other as a true other. Corey Beal's book, Levinas 
and the Wisdom of Love (Waco, TX, Baylor University Press, 2007), is a most helpful 
introduction to Levinas' thought. 
218 Buber. 58. 
219 Ibid., 68. 
69 
relation."220 These phrases appear again and again throughout the book. To Buber, this 
genuine encounter is not just important; it is imperative to being. 
The concentration and fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by 
me, can never be accomplished without me. I require a You to become; becoming 
I, I say You. All actual life is encounter.221 Man becomes an I through a You.222 
It is as if prior to the genuine encounter, the I is also an It, something diminished 
or not yet realized. "The I of the basic word I-You appears [my emphasis] as a person, 
becomes conscious of himself as subjectivity. Egos appear as setting themselves apart 
from other egos. Persons appear by entering into relations with other persons. "223 It was 
earlier mentioned that Aristotle's teleological principle suggested that persons are in the 
process of developing or becoming, moving toward an end. Similarly, modem people in 
the West are no strangers to the idea of striving to become self-actualized or to even grow 
up. I believe Buber is saying something entirely different here. His "becoming an I" bears 
little resemblance to either Aristotle's rational progression toward the Ideal or pop psy-
chology's self-actualization. These all put the locus within the I, Buber places it in the 
encounter. This is what he means in saying that the I becomes "conscious of himself as 
subjectivity." If Descartes argues that, "I Think, therefore I am," Buber counters with "I 
relate, therefore I am." 
I am unwilling to grant the power of constituting personhood merely to other 
humans. What becomes of my I if others refuse to or are unable to interact with me as a 
220 Ibid., 63. 
221 Ibid., 58. 
222 Ibid., 82. 
223 Ibid., 112. 
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You? Am I contingent upon the magnanimous openness to relation of others? Buber hints 
strongly at a Thou, which is beyond the human You, to God. 
/-We. 
Karl Barth uses much of the same ideological landscape and fleshes it out within a 
Trinitarian perspective. 
Even in His divine inner being there is relationship. To be sure, God is One in 
Himself. But he is not alone. There is in Him a co-existence, co-inherence andre-
ciprocity .... He is in Himself the One who loves eternally, the One who is eter-
nally loved, and eternal love; and in this triunity He is the original and source of 
every I and Thou ... 224 
Daniel J. Price notes that Barth refers to this concept as an "analogy of Rela-
tions."225 In this term Barth is agreeing with Buber in calling relationality that which con-
stitutes personhood, and going further. We fundamentally relate because we are created 
in the image of a God whose fundamental nature is relation. In relating to God and to 
others, we are most fully "in God's image." 
Orthodox theologian John D. Zizioulas, in his widely influential book, Being as 
Communion, argues the same point. Rooting his theology in the Cappadocian Fathers, he 
believes that the Cappadocians were the first to root personhood to essential being and 
that this personhood derived its essence from the Triune God. "The mystery of the one 
God in three persons points to a way of being which precludes individualism and sepera-
tion (or self-sufficiency and self-existence) as a criterion of Multiplicity ... To be and to be 
224 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 11!/2 (Edinborough, Scotland: T &T Clark, 
1960), 218. 
225 Daniel Price, "Karl Barth and Object Relations Psychology," in On Being a 
Person, 163. 
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in relation become identical. "226 Stanley Grenz observes that Zizioulas connects this to 
the postmodern condition as "he points out that the concept of 'otherness' stands as per-
haps the central existential concern in postmodern society."227 
Grenz continues, "The fact that from all eternity God pitied and received 
man ... rests on the freedom of God in which there is nothing arbitrary or accidental, but in 
which God is true to Himself. ... God repeats in this relationship ad extra a relationship 
proper to Himself in His inner divine essence. "228 Phil. 2: 6-11 illustrates this perichoretic 
relational emphasis, though it is often overlooked. As Jesus "empties himself' and be-
comes a servant, obedient to the point of death on a cross, he is not acting accidentally or 
in a way unique to himself. This act of self-giving love is "proper to Himself [to the 
Trinitarian nature of God] in His inner divine essence," as Barth says. This is not just 
who Jesus is and what Jesus does. This is the inner nature of God. Torrance says, "He 
[God] is in Himself not other than what he is toward us in his loving and revealing and 
saving presence in Christ."229 As Catherine Mowry LaCugna states it, "God's way ofbe-
ing in relationship with us is in fact God's personhood," for "God for us is who God is as 
God."23o 
226 Zizioulas, 49 & 88. 
227 Stanley J. Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 2004), 139. 
228 Ibid., 218. 
229 T.F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, on Being Three Persons (Edin-
burgh, UK: T &T Clark, 1996), 18. 
230 LaCugna, 304-5. 
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Here Barth, Torrance, and LaCugna offer us something beyond the I-You or even 
the somewhat oblique I-Thou of Buber. We are given, invited into anI-We encounter. 
Invited into the perichoretic love of God. Torrance expresses it like this, "Through a rela-
tion of mutual indwelling between Christ and us, we are enfolded within the infinite di-
mensions of the love of God. ,,23 1 
Reaching out, to give and to receive. Alongside Rublev's painting of the Trinity 
at table, Miroslav Volf offers perhaps the most vivid and arresting imagery for under-
standing perichoretic love in Exclusion and Embrace. 
Built into the very structure of embrace is a 'multifinality' that rests on the sys-
tematic underdetermination of outcomes. Though each may open arms toward the 
other, each has the right to refuse the embrace, to close herself off and stay out-
side the exchange of mutual giving and receiving. And once the embrace has 
taken place, nothing can guarantee a particular outcome. Given the structural ele-
ment of gentleness, we can never know in advance how the reshaping of the self 
and the other will take place in embrace.232 
Elsewhere he states, "The embrace is unthinkable without reciprocity; each is 
both holding and being held by the other, both active and passive .... In an embrace a host 
is a guest and a guest is a host. "233 The images of mutual holding and being held, of 
reaching out to and receiving embrace, of "reshaping the self' to fit the other are potent 
and palpable images. In this sense, there is a liminality to personhood, with personhood 
occurring in the liminal space between I and You. This is the embrace where boundary 
231 Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, 64. 
232 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 
1996), 147. 
233 Ibid., 143. 
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and differentiation are transcended. 234 They give a picture of what Buber' s statement, 
"there is no I without You, there is no you without I" actually looks like. If identity, self-
hood, personhood takes place in the encounter, self is the self in giving/receiving em-
brace. 
Resurrection and participation in the life of God. It is reasonable here to ask, 
"But, how?! How are we drawn into the perichoretic life of God?" Through the resurrec-
tion. Colin Gunton points out that "it must be stressed that redemption is not merely a 
removal of disorder but a redirection and a liberation: it is a resurrection."235 N.T. Wright, 
as has been noted, claims that Jesus ties the parable of the prodigal son and Israel's hope 
of triumphant return from Exile into his personhood and actions and the culmination of 
all is resurrection. "He [Jesus] is making a claim, a claim to be the one in and through 
whom Israel's God is restoring his people .... He believes that [in facing his death], he 
will be vindicated. And the word for that is 'resurrection. "'236 
According to Moltmann, this vindication has the effect of "taking men and 
women, with the whole of creation, into the life-stream of the triune God: that is the 
meaning of creation, reconciliation and glorification. "237 This idea builds upon Ircnal'us' 
view of atonement as serving the function of "recapitulation," reconstituting what it is to 
234 Christine D. Pohl, Making Room: Recovering Hospitality as a Christian Tradi-
tion (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999), 56. 
235 Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement, 150. 
236 Wright, Jesus and the Victmy o.f God, 131. 
237 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 178. 
74 
be human through incarnation, death and resurrection.Z38 "The resurrected Christ is not 
only the pattern of the resurrected body that believers will share; he is also the spiritual 
vitality who will one day bring about the glorious transformation of the new humanity. " 
[emphasis mine ]239 
Conclusion. The advantages of stories. 
Throughout this project, I have sought to frame everything within the context of 
story. Scripture is the story of God. Jesus is the lived story of God. Hosea and the parable 
of the prodigal son are the told stories of God. Our selves, in their relationally constituted 
natures, are indwelled stories. I believe it to be of the utmost importance that when the 
people of Israel described their God they did not list off a series of theological concepts. 
Rather, they said, God was the "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob"-God known by the 
stories of what God had done in history, in relationship with people. Leland Ryken ar-
gues, "The Bible is in large part a work of imagination. Its most customary way of ex-
pressing truth is not the sermon or theological outline but the story, the poem and the vi-
sion."240 
238 Green and Baker, 119-121. 
239 Grenz, 237. 
240 Leland Ryken, "Thinking Christianly About Literature" in The Christian 
Imagination, ed. Leland Ryken (Colorado Springs, CO: Waterbrook Press, 2002), 25. 
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At the beginning of this section, I asked why Young Life talks at the beginning 
and end of the week that centered around stories seemed to have a clarity and emotional 
resonance that is often lacking in the talks that are more theologically driven. As is obvi-
ous at this point, I don't think that is accidental, nor would I say that this is just because 
stories are easy to remember. 
I would argue that, in telling stories of Jesus and relating them to our life experi-
ences (our stories), we are speaking in our native tongue. "Tell me a story. These words 
make up the oldest invitation in the human experience."241 We all tell stories. If one were 
to reduce story to its most basic part, metaphor, we all "live our lives on the basis of in-
ferences we derive via metaphor. Metaphorical thought is unavoidable, ubiquitous and 
mostly unconscious."242 Sociologist Christian Smith observes, "we are animals that not 
only make and tell narratives but we are told and made by our narratives."243 Even our 
abstract theological statements are, at the root, metaphors. Perhaps the question is not 
whether or not to tell stories, but whether or not to tell stories well or in ways that come 
alive. 
Earlier I made use of Peter Rollins' differentiation between idols and icons. C. S. 
Lewis describes the same idea thus, "We demand windows. Literature as Logos is a se-
ries of windows, even of doors." 244 This is how Frederick Buechner can title his wonder-
241 Daniel Taylor, "In Praise of Stories" in The Christian Imagination. 407. 
242 George Lakoff, and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago, IL: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1980) 273. 
243 Christian Smith, Moral Believing Animals (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 78. 
244 C.S. Lewis, "We Demand Windows" in The Christian Imagination. 52. 
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ful book with both wit and truthfulness, Telling the Truth: The Gospel as Tragedy, Com-
edy and Fairytale. 245 This is also how Lewis and Tolkien can argue for the mythopoeic 
truth of stories, that some truths can best be communicated in story, not proposition. 
What I believe they all are pointing to here is that story enables us to speak truthfully in 
ways that do not seek to limit truth to our words. "This is a truthful story of the atone-
ment, but it is a door. I could not find words that would pin down the mystery, sum it up 
for you." It is why Colin Gunton argues that the biblical metaphors of sacrifice, priest, 
king, covenant partner, deliverer all converge, overlap and interpenetrate one another in 
the person and work of Jesus.Z46 
Eighteen years ago, as part of a directed study I did in seminary, I had a phone 
conversation with pastor and writer Walter Wangerin. In discussing his use of story in 
"doing theology" he said, "In my years as a Lutheran pastor, I would teach two years of 
catechism. The first year, I would gather the children every week and do the same thing. I 
would tell them, 'Now I am going to tell you the truth,' and then I would tell them the 
stories of scripture." Only after that would he do any "teaching of church doctrine." 
Telos. Earlier, I argued two points. The first was that our presentations of the 
atonement too often treat it in almost complete isolation from the larger story of which it 
is a part-God's revealing and saving story in the life oflsrael. It can powerfully tell me 
that I am saved, forgiven, but it doesn't tell me much at all about what comes next. "How 
am I to live? What am I to be about?" 
245 Frederick Buechner, Telling the Truth: The Gospel as Tragedy, Comedy and 
Fairytale (San Francisco, CA: Harper San Francisco, 1977). 
246 Gunton, The Actuality of Atonement. 
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I would now argue that this storied and relational approach to the atonement deals 
with both of these concerns. Not only does it tell me about the past story that Jesus is a 
part of, but it is a story with a telos, an end. While granting the importance of individual 
experiences of forgiveness (what most of us mean when we say, "to become a Chris-
tian"), Hauerwas goes on to say, "such experiences cannot in themselves be substitutes 
for learning to find the significance of our lives only in God's ongoing journey with crea-
tion. "247 Or, to quote Eugene Peterson, "There is another reason for the appropriateness 
of story as a major means of bringing us God's word. Story doesn't just tell us something 
and leave us there. It invites our participation. "248 
In speaking with students in Young Life, over the last several years, I have begun 
to describe it like this. 
Picture this. Imagine yourself flying into Dallas, TX and looking out of the win-
dow as you descend. As you look down, you see mile after mile of neighborhoods 
with beautiful homes and fenced in backyards, most of which have what? A 
swimming pool. 
Most of us picture becoming a Christian, I think, like purchasing our very own 
"Jesus swimming pool." It's ours. We can get in and out when we want. We can 
invite the neighbors over for a swim, but they've got their own pool. We can 
regulate the temp, the amount of chlot·ine, how many pool toys we have. Now pic-
ture flying into where I live, Portland, OR. As you descend and look out of the 
right side of the plane, your view is dominated again by water, only this water is 
very different. It's the Columbia River. 
The Columbia started in the mountains of Canada and pours down through Idaho, 
Washington, and Oregon and on to the Pacifica Ocean. It is massive, powerful, 
going somewhere. 
This is what I believe becoming a Christian really is. Not, building a safe, private 
Jesus pool in the backyard, but walking over to the river's edge, taking Jesus' 
247 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame 
Press, 1983), 33. 
248 Eugene Peterson, The Jesus Way (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), 72. 
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hand, and jumping in. There's no telling where the river will take you, who you 
will meet out there, or if it will always be calm and easy. 
But you can be sure it is going somewhere. It is joining into the vast story of 'God 
reconciling the world' that started with the Fall and will continue to the end of 
time. God is inviting you to join in with His vast story. 
Why THIS story? I have attempted to demonstrate that God, through God's reve-
latory acts and words in scripture, is telling a story of relational reconciliation. While 
other metaphors help inform that story (there certainly are ways in which legal or victori-
ous combat imagery contribute), I believe I have shown that the story of God, and the 
story of Jesus' saving work is a particularly relational narrative. This is displayed in the 
emphasis of covenant relationship throughout scripture. It is evident in the relationality of 
God's person in the Trinity, his periclwrr::sis. Grenz states, "the biblical God longs to rec-
oncile sinful humans, adopting them as children of God, and on the basis of the sexual 
(relational) character of human existence, to draw reconciled humanity together with all 
creation into glorious communion with the divine perichoretic life. "249 
This story of a God desiring and facilitating relational reconciliation also takes sin 
seriously. It is a sickness unto death, but relational death not legal. To this end, God goes 
to the ultimate lengths of shame bearing to the point of death to bind God's self with us in 
our shame and brokenness. In so participating with us in our shame, we are borne with 
Jesus into the possibility of new relationship through the resurrection. 
Finally, it is evidenced in how we experience ourselves in the world. The story 
that most adequately describes who we are is that we were made for relationships, that we 
experience the absence of relationships as a kind of death, and that God reconstitutes our 
personhood through the relationally reconciling work of Jesus on the cross and in the res-
249 Grenz, 312. 
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urrection. As the autonomous self, in its thinking, mastering, consuming, using personas 
turns out to be a lie, the relationally contingent self presents itself as the hope of human-
ity. This is uniquely and ultimately our hope when our contingency is rooted in the One 
(and Three) that can truly restore and enliven our relational selves, through reconciliation 
to that One. 
To a God who is personal and whose revelation is in history and, therefore, a nar-
rative, nothing better communicates the inner logic of the cross better than the narratives 
of Hosea and the parable of the prodigal son. In them we find sober assessments of our 
plight, cut off relationally and therefore, de-personed. We also find our inability to re-
spond to this crisis. Most powerfully, however, is the reality that these stories, as is all of 
scripture, are not ultimately about a cheating spouse, a disrespectful son or a sin ravaged 
humanity. They are stories about a God who acts, a God who moves in steadfast love, or 
hesed, to accomplish reconciliation. Shame is borne by Hosea and the father, and in do-
ing so, they create an icon, or window, into the guilt/shame bearing of Christ on the cross. 
I believe this is a beautiful and exciting time to tell the story of Jesus, of the 
atonement to people in the postmodern West. Walker Percy ends his discourse on the 
postmodern self, Lost in the Cosmos, with the fictional remnants of human civilization 
receiving the long awaited "first contact" with alien civilizations. The message asks, in 
part, "Are you in trouble? If you are in trouble, have you sought help? If you did, did it 
come? If it did, did you accept it?"250 
I believe we have, as we perhaps never have before, reached the end of our rope, 
the end of our trust in the self, and are ready to recognize the help that has come. That 
250 Percy, Lost in the Cosmos. 262. 
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help is named, Emmanuel, God with us. I believe we are at last ready to melt into the 
extended arms of a God who loves like Hosea, like the father. Who cries out to us, "Wel-
come home, I have missed you so!" 
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Section 4: Project Description 
The project will be a short to medium length book for a popular readership. It will 
be a narrative-driven presentation of a relational, covenantal approach to atonement the-
ology. The narrative thrust will take the form of short chapters telling stories from scrip-
ture that build the case and narratives drawn from my life and ministry, media. and cul-
ture at large. 
Theological explication, where present, will take a backseat to narrative. The 
book will be loosely constructed along an arch of Created for Relationality-Loss of Rela-
tion-Relations Restored. The reason for this narrative emphasis is both practical and theo-
retical. Practically, I believe narrative is an easily accessible mode for all audiences and 
younger audiences in particular. Theoretically, as has been argued throughout the body of 
this written statement, I believe narrative to be the primary form through which scripture 
speaks to us and is, therefore, the primary mode to access revelation. This is because I 
view God to primarily be revealed in history, in relationality, therefore, narrative is how 
we know God. 
There will be a certain amount of non-linearity to the project. I intend to interpose 
quotes, lyrics of songs, and images that contribute to the overall arch of the story, but 
may or not be specifically tied to the narrative at that point. The goal is to provide multi-
ple "hooks" for the reader to access the ideas discussed in the book without putting too 
much burden on them the reader to track the argument of the case at every point. 
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Shane Claiborne's recent book, Jesus for President251, serves as an illustration of 
some of what I have in mind conceptually. The book has a linear text driven component. 
At the same time, the book is interspersed with a multitude of quotes and images, none of 
which appear in the main text, though they are related themes to the chapters in which 
they appear. The effect is that it feels as if one is reading two or more books at the same 
time. One could just read the quotes and look at the images and come away with a pretty 
clear sense of what the book is about. The layering of text, additional quotes and images 
have a synergistic effect which is quite striking. 
In trying to create something of the same feel, I hope to center this layering effect 
around two or three cognitive-emotional realities. The pain of relational loss would be on 
and the joy of reconciliation as another. As mentioned in my main text, Volf' s Exclusion 
and Embrace, has become a very formative book in my mind. My vision would be to 
have the image of "embrace" be one that settles into the reader's mind and heart and 
grows and expands there. In essence, I'd like to boil down the vast storehouse of theology 
of the atonement to a few basic biblical stories and then boil down these still further to 
one distilled image-embrace. 
251 Shane Claiborne and Chris Haw, Jesus For President: Politics for Ordinary 
Radicals (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2008). 
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Section 5: Project Specifications 
Audience: My audience will be two-fold. Older high school and college aged students. 
The age group of folks I work with in Young Life and my teaching at George Fox Uni-
versity. The second audience would be those who work with this age demographic. 
Goals: This project will jointly serve as a tool to minister the story of God's grace to the 
reader in a way that is accessible and impacting. Additionally, it will serve as a model to 
those engaged in ministry of how one could communicate the atonement in non-
traditional ways. 
Standards of publication: I will need to produce an abstract that I could send to potential 
publishers. I will need to procure permission to use the various images and quotes, if they 
are copyrighted. I will need to write at a professional level. 
Action plan for completion: I have already written a number of essays that will make up 
portions of the project. I have also begun gathering quotes and images. I will continue to 
write and gather in a focused way through July and August of this year, 2008, so as to 
present a completed product for evaluation on Sept. 15\ 2008. 
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Appendix A.: Kraus' Comparison of Shame vs. Guilt Approaches to Atonement 
Shame Guilt 
(focus upon the self) (focus upon the act) 
Nature of fault 
Failure to meet self-expectations Failure to meet legal expectations 
Internal Reaction 
Disgrace Remorse 
Fear of abandonment Fear of punishment 
Embarrassment Condemnation 
Self-isolation Self-justification 
Alienation Hostility 
Social Reaction 
Ridicule and exclusion Demand for revenge or penalty 
Remedy 
Identification and communication with Propitiation through restitution or penalty 
Interpretations of the Cross 
An instrument of shame An instrument of penalty 
God's ultimate identification with us in our God's ultimate substitute for our sinful 
sinful shame guilt 
Expresses God's love E G d' . . 252 xpresses o s justice 
252 Kraus, 204. 
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